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Book Review 
Corporate Anatomy Lessons 
David A. Skeel, Jr.t 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach. By Reinier Kraakman * et al. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004. Pp. 260. $85 .00. 
INTRODUCTION 
Every ten years or so, a book is published that sets the terms of 
discussion in corporate law scholarship for the years that follow. In 1 976, 
Melvin Eisenberg published The Structure of the Corporation, I a work 
that redefined how scholars and policymakers thought about the role of 
the board of directors. Eisenberg' s  model of the "monitoring board"-a 
board that oversees the managers of a company instead of attempting to 
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am grateful to Henry 
Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Hideki Kanda, Reinier Kraakman, Stephen Lubben, Katharina 
Pistor, and Harry Rajak for helpful comments; to Brian Nelson and the editors of The Yale 
Law Journal for numerous insightful suggestions for improving the Review; and to the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School for generous summer funding. This Review is 
dedicated to the memory of Michael Whincop, who was a great friend, a rising star, and an. 
important contributor to the literature discussed in the Review. 
* Ezra Ripley Thayer Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
1. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976). The first in a 
line of classic corporate law books, and still by far the most influential book ever written on 
American corporate law, was ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932), which identified the growing separation 
between ownership and control in America's largest corporations. The most influential book in 
the intervening years was a collection of essays, THE CORPORA nON IN MODERN SOCIETY 
(Edward S. Mason ed., 1959). 
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run the business directly-continues to define our expectations of a 
properly functioning board. Next came The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, which 
reworked a series of their classic articles from the 1 980s.2 Writing from a 
law-and-economics perspective, Easterbrook and Fischel contended that 
the principal task of corporate law is to limit the conflict of interest-or 
"agency costs"-between managers and shareholders, and that American 
corporate law facilitates this goal by providing a menu of default rules 
the parties can alter by contract if they so choose.  The most recent 
addition to this pantheon was Mark Roe ' s  1 994 book, Strong Managers, 
Weak Owners, which challenged the traditional assumption that the 
emergence of America' s widely held corporations was dictated entirely 
by economics.3 In Strong Managers, Weak Owners, Roe noted that, 
unlike American corporations, where shareholders are scattered and 
rarely play a prominent role, German and Japanese firms are often 
monitored by large shareholders such as banks and insurance companies. 
He attributed the difference as much to politics-the traditional 
American hostility to concentrated financial power-as to economics. 
The book that will lay the groundwork for the corporate law debates 
of the coming decade is The Anatomy of Corporate Law.4 Written by 
seven of the world ' s  leading corporate law scholars-Henry Hansmann, 
Reinier Kraakman, and Ed Rock of the United States; Paul Davies of 
England; Gerard Hertig of Switzerland; Klaus Hopt of Germany; and 
Hideki Kanda of Japan-The Anatomy of Corporate Law attempts to 
identify the underlying structure of corporate law and to provide a 
framework for understanding the wide range of approaches that different 
countries take to corporate regulation. "What is the common structure of 
the law of business corporations . . .  across different national 
jurisdictions?" the authors ask at the outset.s 
It is hard to overstate the significance-and, as we shall see, the 
success-of this  project. Traditional comparative corporate law 
scholarship has tended to explore the differences among jurisdictions in 
intricate detail. The authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law insist that 
2. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R .  FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPOR ATE LAW (199 1 ) . 
3. MARK 1. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERJCAN CORPORATE FINANCE ( 1 994). 
4. REINTER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPOR ATE LAW: A COMPAR ATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL ApPROACH (2004). 
5. Id. at 1 .  
__ I
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these local vanahons are only that-variations on a single, common 
theme. Throughout the book, they take a functional approach, 
emphasizing the extent to which countries that seem to have very 
different legal rules nevertheless tend to develop roughly similar 
solutions to the characteristic problems of corporate law. 
The central i ssue for corporate law in every jurisdiction, they argue, 
is how to mediate three kinds of agency conflicts: between managers and 
shareholders, between majority and minority shareholders, and between 
the finn and third parties. To understand how different co-untries address 
these competing claims, the authors develop a typology of ten different 
strategies. The authors divide these strategies across two vectors : first by 
operational criteria, categorizing each strategy broadly as either a 
"regulatory" or a "governance" approach; then by temporal criteria, 
separating strategies that operate ex ante from others that come into p lay 
ex post.6 Having developed their schema, the authors then apply it to 
related party transactions, control transactions, investor protection, and a 
variety of other key corporate law issues . 
The great virtue of The Anatomy of Corporate Law is that its 
typology of strategies provides a simple, user-friendly way to compare 
the corporate law regimes of a wide range of different countries .  
Although scholars will surely debate both the authors ' typology and their 
claim that several basic agency cost problems lie at the heart of every 
corporate law system, the essential framework is likely to withstand even 
the most relentless scrutiny.7 Almost as remarkable as the typology itself 
is the clarity and elegance of the analysis--especially given that the book 
is the work of seven different scholars. The authors develop and apply 
their typology in well under three hundred pages, a succinctness that 
would fill the editors of that other anatomical guide, Gray 's A natomy,8 
with envy. 
6. For readers who are already counting the parts of the typology, I should note that there 
are two regulatory strategies and three governance strategies, each of which has both an ex 
ante and an ex post version. This gives the typology its total of ten parts. 
7. At a seminar at the London School of Economics in June 2003 that focused on the book 
in anticipation of its publication, and for which I began thinking about the issues discussed in 
this Review, the invited guests (roughly forty academics and top corporate lawyers) spent 
much of the day trying to poke holes in the authors' typology and its emphasis on agency 
costs-but without success. 
8. Gray's Anatomy, the best·known general purpose medical handbook, comes in at 
roughly six times the length of The Anatomy o/Corporate Law. See GRAY'S ANATOMY (Peter 
L. Williams et al. eds., Churchill Livingstone 37th ed. 1989). 
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To say so much in so brief a compass, the authors obviously had to 
exercise ruthless editorial judgment on what to include and what to omit. 
After describing their typology and exploring· several of their 
applications, I spend much of this Review focusing on issues and 
perspectives that the authors left out. At a general level, the book's most 
important limitation is that it does not take its functionafist approach far 
enough. Functional analysis, as the legal realists understood that term, 
encompasses not only legal rules, but also norms, history, and social 
context. Although the authors are careful not to limit themselves to the 
"law on the books," The Anatomy of Corporate Law focuses heavily on 
legal regulation, and tends to give short shEift to these other factors. This 
gives the book a somewhat ahistorical quality, and makes it seem less 
"functional" than one might expect. To borrow an analogy from the 
world of art, it is as if the typology is drawn from casts of ancient 
sculptures, rather than drawn from life.9 
The Review also argues that the book leaves out several crucial 
facets of corporate law. The most important omission is the bankruptcy 
or insolvency regime. In recent years, it has become increasingly 
apparent that bankruptcY-Dr corporate reorganization-is best seen as a 
component of corporate law. Indeed, I argue that it is impossible to 
understand other corporate law issues without appreciating the role that 
bankruptcy plays in shaping the incentives of managers and other 
constituencies even while the corporation is financially healthy. 
The authors also omit any sustained discussion of corporate 
groups-that is, the parent-subsidiary arrangements that characterize 
nearly every large corporation. Although the authors refer to the 
extensive regulations of corporate groups in Germany and elsewhere, 
they have little to say about these regulations and do not offer any 
analysis of the factors that influence a company's decision whether to set 
up a new business as a division within an existing corporation or to 
locate the business in a separate corporation. 
Finally, the authors do not fully consider the distinctive challenges of 
corporate governance in emerging countries. Although they suggest that 
the book's ten-part typology is relevant to any country, the authors' 
analysis focuses on five notably developed jurisdictions-the United 
9. "The beginner can at the very outset," the American artist Thomas Eakins said in 
defense of his teaching philosophy in 1 881, "get more from the riving modef in a given time 
than from study of the antique in twice that period" 1 LLOYD GOODRICH, THOMAS EAKINS 
1 74 ( 1 982) (internal quotation marks omitted) . 
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States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan. In the 
developing and transition nations whose corporate law has been a 
particular concern in recent years, by contrast, it is important to move 
beyond the typology in order to account for problems such as l imited 
judicial enforcement. 
Part I of the Review describes the authors ' typology and explores 
some of the insights that emerge when they apply it to issues such as 
self-interested transactions and the market for corporate control.  Part I I  
considers the limits of  the authors' functionalist approach and argues that 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law should be seen as a prequel to , rather 
than an extension of, important recent debates over the political 
determinants of different corporate law regimes and the likelihood 
that corporate law is converging around the world. Parts III-V then 
discuss bankruptcy, corporate groups, and the special issues raised by 
corporate governance in emerging nations. I offer the last three Parts as a 
kind of friendly amendment (though an amendment that articulates my 
own-perhaps at times conflicting-vision of corporate law) to the book. 
These Parts can be seen as a plea that the authors add chapters on 
bankruptcy and corporate groups to their book in the future, and that they 
highlight the distinctive concerns of developing nations in its epilogue. 
These additions are all it would take to make the anatomy complete . 
I. THE BASIC ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 
The audacious goal of The Anatomy of Corporate Law is, in the 
authors ' words, "to offer a common language and a general analytic 
framework with which to understand the purposes that can potentially be 
served by corporate law, and with which to compare and evaluate the 
efficacy of different legal regimes in serving those purposes."IO This 
objective does not distill to a claim that the business corporations of 
every country are, once we scratch beneath the surface a bit, identical . 
Nor do the authors claim that the laws governing corporations are 
heading in this direction, converging toward a single framework 
(although several of the authors have made essentially this claim 
elsewhere, and the book presents evidence of convergence in the five 
10. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4. 
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jurisdictions on which it focuses). I r The point, instead, is that 
"corporations have a fundamentally similar set of legal characteristics­
and face a fundamentally similar set of legal problems-in all 
jurisdictions .,
, 12 The underlying template and the problems are the same; 
the way they are addressed may be quite different. 
After describing the basic attributes of the corporation in the first 
chapter, the authors develop their typology-their common language and 
general analytic framework-in chapter 2; they then spend the remainder 
of the book applying it to a series of corporate law issues. To lay the 
groundwork for the remainder of this Review, this Part adopts the same 
strategy . I describe the authors ' account of the attributes- of the finn, and 
summarize their ten-part typology and the agency problems to which it 
responds . I then highlight some of the insights the book offers into the 
key dilemmas of corporate law. 
A. Tweaking the Traditional Attributes oj the Corporation 
In the beginning is the corporation itself. The Anatomy oj Corporate 
Law does not dwell on the reasons that businesses choose to incorporate 
rather than use another enterprise form. The authors take it as a given 
that the vast majority of large businesses are likely to be organized as 
corporations or in an equivalent form, and that most small firms that are 
held by more than two owners also adopt the corporate form. 
What this means in practice, the authors argue, is that most 
substantial firms have five basic characteristics in common: legal 
personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management 
under a board structure, and investor ownership. The initial list of 
attributes is to some extent familiar turf for anyone who has read a 
corporate law treatise or taken a law school class on corporations in the 
II. The strong view of convergence is defended in Hemy Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakm an , The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO . L.J. 439 (2001). Another one of 
the authors, Gerard Hertig, has taken a more cautious view, emphasizing the complexity of the 
analysis and the need to take differences in actual enforcement into account. Gerard Hertig, 
Convergence of Substantive Law and Convergence of Enforcement: A Comparison, in 
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark 
J. Roe. eds., forthcoming 2004). Although Kraakman emphasizes in the preface to The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law that the authors "do not articulate a political economy of legal 
convergence in corporate law," he also hastens to add that the "book as a whole offers 
persuasive evidence of convergence across our major jurisdictions. � KRAAKMAN IT AL., supra 
note 4, at vii. 
12. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1. 
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last thirty or forty years. And its role is simply to serve as a springboard 
for the authors ' most important innovation-the typology they will 
develop and apply throughout the book. But even here, there are hints of 
a new perspective. Rather than recycling the traditional five-factor 
description of the corporation, the authors reshape both the attributes and 
the overall account. 1 3  
The two attributes that track the standard account most closely are 
limited liability and transferabi lity . Limited liability-which means that 
the shareholders of a corporation generally do not have any liability 
beyond the capital they have contributed to the corporation in return for 
their shares-is the attribute most laypeople associate with the corporate 
form. Transferability refers to the fact that, so long as there are no 
contractual restrictions, shareholders have the right to transfer their 
shares, and this shift in ownership does not interfere with the existence or 
operation of the corporation. 
In the standard account, the authors' fourth attribute, "delegated 
management under a board structure," would be labeled "centralized 
management." Because corporations have limited liability and the 
corporation does not dissolve if a shareholder dies or sells her shares, the 
corporate form facilitated a division of labor between investors and 
managers. In the United States,  this  division emerged most strikingly in 
the nineteenth-century railroads, as chronicled by Alfred Chandler and 
others. I4 By rechristening this attribute, The Anatomy of Corporate Law 
underscores the significance of the board of directors as an intermediary 
between shareholders and managers. IS Shareholders ordinarily have the 
right to elect directors, but it i s  the directors who choose and oversee the 
managers. Thus, as the phrase "delegated management under a board 
13. The traditional list of corporate attributes includes: limited liability, free transferability 
of ownership interests, continuity of existence or "perpetual life," centralized management, 
and entity status. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, COR PORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZA nONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 100 (8th ed. unabr. 2000) (listing and describing 
these five attributes). 
14. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (describing the emergence of middle managers 
and a hierarchical structure in American business). 
15. "Manager" is a somewhat slippery term in the corporate world. In the conventional 
definition, which I adopt here, managers are the executives who run the corporation on a day­
to-day basis. The firm's highest-level executives, such as the chie f executive officer (CEO) 
and the chief financial officer (CFO), often serve on the board as well and are referred to as 
"inside directors" in that capacity. Thus, there is often an overlap between a company's 
managers and its directors. 
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structure" suggests, the directors are the crucial lillk between 
shareholders and the decisionmaking authority that shareholders 
implicitly delegate to the day-to-day managers . 
The authors have created "investor ownership," the fifth 
characteristic in their initial list of attributes, out of whole cloth. In the 
traditional recitation, the fifth attribute would be continuity of interest or 
"perpetual" life-the fact that, so long as they keep making money and 
paying their debts, corporations are eternal. Why omit perpetual life? 
Presumably, the authors concluded that the permanence of the corporate 
form is already captured in the concept of legal personality, and thus that 
continuity of interest wouldn' t  be missed (save, perhaps, by a few 
corporate law scholars who have a deep attachment to the traditional 
incantation). One cannot help but imagine that Henry Hansmann (who 
not co incidentally is one of the coauthors of the initial chapter) was the 
one who dropped perpetual life and slipped "investor ownership" into the 
mix. Hansmann is the author of an extremely important book on the 
choice among different enterprise forms.I6 The emphasis  on investor 
ownership is designed to highlight the fact that the shareholders of a 
corporation enjoy both the right to control the firm and the right to 
receive the firm's  net earnings. In other enterprise forms, either or both 
of these rights may be missing.17 
I have saved the first attribute, legal personality, for last because it 
has received by far the most attention in the recent literature and will 
figure prominently in my analysis later in the Review. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the nature of corporate 
personality was hotly debated by European, and then American, 
corporate scholars. The principal question was whether corporations are 
"real" entities, with a philosophically separate existence, or whether they 
are simply aggregations of shareholders or artificial entities that owe 
their powers entirely to the state.I8 From a twenty-first-century vantage 
point, the debate is excruciating; it is the corporate law equivalent of the 
16. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996). 
17. In a limited partnership, for instance, the limited partners have the right to receive the 
partnership's net earnings but cannot take part in the control of the partnership. See, e.g., 
EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 480-90. 
18. For an excellent analysis of the debate as it played out in the United States, see 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF 
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 68 (1992). Horwitz argues that the "natural entity" view figured 
prominently in the legitimization of large-scale corporate enterprise in the late nineteenth 
century. 
2004] Corporate Anatomy Lessons 1 527 
medieval quarrels over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. 
Indeed, the debate is often viewed as having ended when the pragmatist 
philosopher John Dewey published an article in this journal arguing that 
the various views collapsed into each other, and each could be used to 
support any outcome on a particular issue. 19 Certainly, we should be 
careful not to understate the significance of the opposing views. In the 
United States, the persistence of the natural entity theory has contributed 
to the legal treatment of corporations as "persons" that are entitled to 
constitutional protections such as free speech rights-as well as subject 
to criminal liability for their acts. But most corporate law scholars simply 
took corporate personality for granted for decades after the philosophical 
debate petered out. 
In the past five years, two of the authors of The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law, Hansmann and Kraakman, have put corporate 
personhood back on the scholarly radar screen by arguing (on economic 
rather than philosophical grounds) that corporate personality is the single 
most important attribute of the corporate form. The key attribute of 
corporate personhood, in their view, lies in two protections that ·they 
refer to collectively as "affirmative asset partitioning.,
,20 The first 
protection is priority status for creditors of the corporation. Corporate 
law underscores the separate existence of the corporation by giving 
corporate creditors first dibs on its assets; only after they have been paid 
are creditors of the corporation ' s  shareholders entitled to share in the 
assets . In effect, this treatment segregates the company' s  assets and as a 
result enables creditors to monitor more effectively. The second 
component of corporate personhood, liquidation protection, assures that 
individual shareholders "cannot withdraw their share of firm assets at 
will, thus forcing partial or complete liquidation of the firm, nor can the 
personal creditors of [a shareholder] foreclose on the [shareholder's] 
share of firm assets. 
, ,21 Liquidation protection diminishes the risk that a 
company ' s  going-concern value will be destroyed as the result of 
financial grabs by shareholders or their creditors. 
19. John Dewey, The Historic Background a/ Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 
655 (1926). 
20. Hansmann and Kraakrnan develop their theory in Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakrnan, The Essential Role 0/ Organizational Law, 110 YALE LJ. 387 (2000), and Henry 
Hansmann, Reinier Kraakrnan & Richard Squire, Legal Entities, Asset Partitioning, and the 
Evolution of Organizations (Sept. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
21. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 7. 
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What makes affinnative asset partItIOning especially important is  
that the parties could not realistically create it themselves. All  of the 
other attributes theoretically could be replicated through contractual 
provisions (just as the attributes can be, and often are, altered or 
eliminated by contract). But it would be nearly impossible to achieve 
affinnative asset partitioning by contract, due to the huge number of 
actual and potential parties involved (which would include every creditor 
of every current or future shareholder of the enterprise)_22 As a result, it 
is here that the corporate fonn, as supplied by the state, plays its most 
important role. 
Although the description of corporate personhood in The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law is drawn directly from Hansmann and Kraakman's work, 
it p lays little role in the analysis of the book. The authors quickly leave 
this and the other attributes of the corporation behind. They take the 
existence of the finn and its boundaries as a given throughout the book, 
and focus on the relationships among the principal parties within an 
established finn. As we shall see, it is  unfortunate that the corporate 
boundary issues leave almost no further trace on the analysis; the choice 
of boundaries, as it turns out, is an essential part of the anatomy of 
corporate law?3 
B .  The Typology at the Heart afCorporate Law 
1 .  The Three-Headed Problem of Agency Costs 
Having dispensed with corporate law's  initial function, establishing 
and defining the parameters of the corporate fonn, the authors go on to 
develop the typology that governs the remainder of the book. This entire 
typology is based on a startlingly simple claim: The authors argue that 
the chief end of corporate governance is to control the inevitable 
conflicts of interest that arise among the principal constituencies of the 
corporation-nothing more, nothing less. These conflicts fall into three 
general categories: conflicts between the corporation ' s  shareholders and 
22. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 20, at 410-12, 429. John Armour and Michael 
Whincop argue that another important role of corporate law is to establish the authority 
structure that governs the relationships among various constituencies of the firm. John Armour 
& Michael 1. Whincop, The Proprietary Structure of Corporate Law (Aug. 2001) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
23. See infra Part IV (reintroducing asset partitioning to analyze boundary issues and 
corporate groups). 
--- #' 
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its managers; between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders; and between the cOIJloration and contracting parties such 
as creditors, employees, and customers . 
As is customary in the cOIJlorate governance literature, the authors 
refer to these conflicts as "agency" or "principal-agent" problems. These 
kinds of problems, they note, "arise[] whenever the welfare of one party, 
termed the 'principal, ' depends on actions taken by another party, termed 
the' agent. ",24 In layperson's terms, whenever one party acts on behalf of 
another, there is a risk that he will pursue his own interests rather than 
those of the other party. 
For American readers, the most familiar of these problems is the 
first: the potential conflict between shareholders and the company's 
managers and directors . Although the directors (and through them, the 
managers) are representatives of the shareholders (and sometimes of 
other constituencies as well) , they may pay more attention to protecting 
their jobs, benefits, or the privileges of running the business than to the 
best interests of the shareholders and the company. The problem can be 
particularly acute if-as has traditionally been the case in the United 
States, and more recently the United Kingdom as well-shareholdings 
are diffuse.25 
If, by contrast, some of the shareholders hold significant blocks of 
stock-as is often the case in continental Europe and Japan-the authors' 
second category of potential conflict arises: Blockholders may use their 
influence to direct benefits to themselves at the expense of the 
company' s  other, scattered shareholders. These blockholders, who may 
be members of a controlling family or a financial institution such as a 
bank, may contract with the company on attractive terms or use the 
company' s  assets as their own. 
The authors ' final category of conflict arises out of the fact that the 
company (at the behest of its owners or managers) may exploit one or 
more of the other constituencies with whom it contracts' by shifting 
24. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 2L 
25. Identifying this problem, which they referred to as the separation of ownership from 
control, was the central insight of Berle and Means's landmark book The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1 .  In recent decades, institutional 
shareholders such as mutual and pension funds have become major stockholders in most large 
U.S. corporations, and they hold even larger stakes in U.K. companies. See, e.g . ,  Bernard S. 
Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited 
Regulation, 92 MICH. L REv. 1997 (1994). 
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excessive risk to its creditors, mistreating its employees, or deceiving the 
consumers who buy its products. 
The authors ' claim that addressing these three agency problems is 
the single overriding objective of corporate law is certain to generate 
fierce debate. As noted earlier, at a full-day seminar celebrating the book 
in June 2003, a group of commentators and participants repeatedly 
questioned whether this is the proper lens through which to view 
corporate governance.26 Although the participants. agreed that 
relationships among the various constituencies are the central issue in 
corporate law, there was far less consensus on whether the agency cost 
notion is the best way to analyze these relationships .  Two of 
the counterproposals will give the flavor of the initial debate. 
One commentator, Jonathan Rickford, suggested that the real issue 
in corporate governance is not so much agency problems as control 
rights-that is, the proper allocation of powers among the various 
constituencies of the corporation. The issue, he argued, consists of 
questions such as what issues should be within the shareholders ' 
prerogative, how authority should be divided between the corporation ' s  
managers and its board (or boards) of  directors, and how much influence 
employees should have over corporate decisionmaking. Although the 
authors acknowledged the importance of control rights-and the 
roles that both law and private contract play in allocating corporate 
power-they argued that the underlying goal of such an allocation is to 
minimize agency costs . Manager control is often overridden, for 
instance, in contexts such as takeovers, where managers have a 
particularly strong incentive to favor their own interests at the expense of 
shareholders and the firm. 
A second debate centered on the term "agency" itself. Rather than 
principal-agent relations, several participants insisted, the relationships 
among the constituencies of the corporation are promissory in nature . 
Managers and employees are subject to employment contracts, and 
creditors and customers have their own contractual relations with the 
company. Most of these relationships do not fit the traditional agency 
paradigm of a principal transferring control over the res of a trust to an 
agent, the trustee, who acts on the principal's behalf. In response, the 
authors emphasized that the conception of "agency" employed by The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law is the economists '  more general conception 
26. See supra note 7. 
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of principal-agent relations (a usage that i s  now standard in the corporate 
law literature as well, as noted above), rather than the traditional, 
doctrinal legal definition. One of the authors, Paul Davies, also pointed 
out that many corporate relationships are more dependency-based than 
truly promissory in nature-that is, the promisor-promisee paradigm is 
too narrow to capture many aspects of corporate law, such as directors' 
fiduciary duties to shareholders or the corporation's environmental 
obligations. 
Each of these issues can be expected to resurface as scholars grapple 
with the insights of the book, and there will be additional debates as 
well-for example, given that agency cost analysis tends to be economic 
in its focus, future commentators are likely to argue that The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law does not place enough emphasis on social or moral 
concerns. Yet the book's analysis does not preclude these considerations, 
and its authors make a powerful argument that the choices made in any 
given jurisdiction will have predictable economic consequences, 
consequences that are best seen in agency cost terms. 
By the end of the London seminar, the authors' claim that agency 
costs lie at the heart of corporate law had withstood even the most 
aggressive pummeling. I strongly suspect this will be the case in the 
broader corporate governance literature as well. At least for the 
developed economies that are the authors' principal focus, agency 
conflicts are precisely the right starting point.27 
2 .  The Ten-Category Typology of Corporate Governance 
It is here that the anatomy lessons truly begin. The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law divides all of corporate law into a total of ten different 
strategies for protecting principals from expropriation by corporate 
double agents.28 These strategies fall into two general categories, four of 
which the authors refer to as "regulatory strategies," and six that are 
characterized as "governance strategies." Let me begin by describing the 
27. For a discussion of the very different issues raised in the context of developing 
economies, see Part V. 
28. Given that there are three different kinds of agency problems, the identities of the 
principal and agent will vary in the three contexts. Shareholders are the principal, and 
managers the agents, in the first type of agency problem; minority shareholders are the 
principal, and controlling shareholders the agent, in the second; and various third parties are 
the principal, and the corporation (or its owners) the agent, in the last. 
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two general categories, then turn to the strategies within each category. A 
table of the entire schema i s  included below.29 
TABLE 1 .  STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING PRINCIPALS 
Rules Entry Selection Initiation Trusteeship 
Standards Exit Removal Veto Reward 
Regulatory strategies have a prescriptive quality. They impose direct 
performance requirements on the agent, and they set the terms for 
forming or dissolving the principal's relationship with the company. 
Governance strategies, by contrast, focus more on the ongoing principal­
agent relationship; the goal of these strategies is to "protect principals 
indirectly, either by enhancing their power or by molding the incentives 
of their agents .
,,30 Provisions restricting the right of a manager or 
controlling shareholder to enter into contracts with the corporation are an 
example of the "regulatory" approach, whereas shareholders' authority to 
vote on directors and certain major transactions is a governance strategy . 
W ithin each of the major categories, the authors refine the strategies 
further by making a series of additional distinctions . Start with the 
regulatory strategies . The authors identify two types of regulatory 
strategies, which they characterize as "agent constraints" and "affiliation 
terms." By "agent constraints," the authors have in mind provisions that 
define the parameters of permissible agent conduct. Dividend restrictions 
are an illustration of an agent constraint, since they limit the ability of the 
29. The schema is outlined in KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 23-28. Because the 
authors' overview is succinct, I will not refer to specific page numbers for the ten strategies in 
the description that follows. 
30. Jd. at 23. 
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company (the agent) to disburse dividends, in order to protect a principal 
(here, the creditors) who could be hurt by excessive dividends. Whereas 
agent constraints focus on the agent's midstream conduct, "affiliation 
tenns" dictate the tenns on which the principal (that is, shareholders) 
begin or end their relationship with the agent. Perhaps the most familiar 
affiliation tenn is the set of mandatory disclosure requirements that 
provide infonnation to investors who are deciding whether or not to buy 
a company' s  stock. 
As a final refinement of the regulatory strategies discussion, the 
authors distinguish between agent constraints and affiliation tenns that 
operate ex ante, and those that come into play ex post. The authors refer 
to ex ante agent constraints, such as the dividend restrictions mentioned 
in the previous paragraph, as "rules," and to ex post agent constraints, 
such as judicial scrutiny of whether the managers have fulfilled their 
fiduciary duties, as "standards ." With affiliation tenns, ex ante tenns 
govern the parties' entry into an agency relationship and are called, 
appropriately enough, "entry" tenns; "exit" tenns regulate tennination of 
the relationship. Mandatory disclosure obligations are a common· entry 
tenn, and appraisal rights-which pennit shareholders to insist that the 
company buy back their shares under certain circumstances-focus on 
exit tenns. 
Lawmakers thus have a total of four regulatory strategies in their 
arsenal : two agent constraints (rules and standards) and two affiliation 
tenns (entry and exit) . 
Tum now to the governance strategies. Here, the authors identify 
three different strategies, which they call "appointment rights," "decision 
rights," and "agent incentives ." An appointment right is the principal ' s  
right to appoint or  remove the relevant agent. The most familiar 
illustration of this strategy is shareholders' right to vote on the 
corporation's  directors . Decision rights give the principal similar powers 
with respect to particular transactions, as when shareholders have the 
right to approve or reject a proposed merger or amendment of the 
company's charter. Agent incentives are strategies- that are designed 
either·to minimize the self-interest of the decisionrnaking agent (as with 
a requirement that only disinterested directors vote on a transaction 
involving one of the other directors) or, alternatively, to align the agent' s  
incentives with those of the principal, thus harnessing the agent's self­
interest (as when managers are given performance-based compensation). 
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Each of the three governance strategies also comes in either an ex 
ante or an ex post variety. The authors refer to ex ante appointment rights 
as "selection" rights; an example of these is the right of shareholders to 
vote on the company's directors . The authors refer to the ex post version 
as "removal" rights; an example of these is ousting a director, which 
sometimes requires a showing of cause and sometimes does not. With 
decision rights, the ex ante strategy is the right of "initiation," while ex 
post decision rights are referred to as a "veto" power. Thus, shareholders 
are generally given the authority to initiate a few transactions, such as 
bylaw changes in the United States, and shareholders have the authority 
to veto (or approve, if they so choose) major transactions" such as 
mergers or sales of most or all of the corporation's assets. Finally, the 
authors divide agent incentives into ex ante "trusteeship" strategies and 
ex post "reward" strategies . They point to disinterestedness requirements 
and nonlegal constraints on agent perfonnance such as conscience and 
professional pride as examples of the trusteeship strategy. High-powered 
incentives such as perfonnance-based pay, on the other hand, operate as 
"rewards . " 
Added together, there are a total of six strategies on the governance 
side of the ledger: a pair of appointment rights strategies (selection and 
removal), a pair of decision rights approaches (initiation and veto), and a 
final pair of agent incentives (trusteeship and reward) . 
That 's  it. Much as linguists have long sought to identify the deep 
structure of language, the authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law 
offer their ten-part schema as a complete map of corporate law. These 
ten strategies are the tools that lawmakers use to keep the three different 
kinds of agency problems in check. Although I argue in Parts III -V for a 
broader application of the anatomical framework, the schema itself 
elegantly captures the full range of corporate law strategies. Nothing is 
mlssmg. 
C.  The Typology in Action 
Having defined the attributes of a corporation and developed their 
ten-part typology of legal strategies in the first chapter, the authors of 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law proceed to apply it  to a series of key 
corporate law issues in chapters 3 through 8, before summarizing their 
findings and conclusions in chapter 9. To complete this overview of the 
:� 
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book, let me briefly describe the maj or substantive chapters and some of 
the insights of each. 
In chapter 3, the authors provide an overview of the strategies in 
action, exploring some of the ways in which they are actually 
implemented. The authors point out, for instance, that each of their five 
principal jurisdictions-the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, and Japan-gives shareholders a broad right of 
appointment,3 l  and that U .S .  corporations tend to rely more heavily on 
the reward strategy (by paying managers in stock and stock options J than 
corporations elsewhere. 32 Examining conflicts between controlling and 
minority shareholders, they note that cumulative voting is the most 
common appointment rights strategy used to protect minority 
shareholders. 33 With regard to the agency problem between the company 
and nonshareholder constituencies, the authors focus most extens ively on 
the decision whether to give employees representation on a company's  
board of directors (a  selection strategy).  The fact that this strategy is rare 
except where mandated by law-as in Germany and the N etherlands­
suggests, they argue, that the costs of employee representation (such as 
divisiveness on the board) exceed its benefits. 34 
Chapter 4 addresses creditor protection measures such as minimum 
capital and dividend rules. After noting some of the standard 
justifications for creditor protections, the authors focus on the use of 
entry requirements (in particular, mandatory disclosure) and the two 
agent constraints-rules and standards. The United States imposes the 
most extensive disclosure requirements for large corporations, whereas 
Japan and European countries are stricter with small corporations.35 The 
authors find striking differences in the use of legal capital rules such as 
the requirement that corporations maintain a minimum amount of capital . 
Minimum capital rules have gone the way of the dodo in the United 
3 l .  Id. at 44-46. 
32. Id. at 5 l .  
33 .  Id. at 54-55. With cumulative voting, each shareholder is given a number of votes 
equal to the number of shares she owns, mUltiplied by the total number of directors who will 
be elected. Rather than voting on each directorial slot individually, as is done with traditional 
voting, shareholders can spread their votes over as few or as many candidates as they like. 
Because it  enables minority shareholders to stack their votes on a sma[J number of candidates, 
cumulative voting increases the likelihood that they can elect at least one of the directors. For 
discussion, see, for example, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New 
Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1 24 ( 1 994). 
34. K.RAAKMAN ET AL, supra note 4, at 64. 
35 .  Id. at 79, 81. 
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States, but figure prominently in continental Europe.36 The authors 
speculate that the prominence of these requirements in continental 
Europe may stem from the fact that these are civil law systems (which 
rely more on strict rules and less on judicial discretion) and that banks 
are central to corporate governance in these countries. Although the 
differences in the formal rules of the five principal jurisdictions are stark, 
the authors conclude that this starkness is somewhat misleading. In 
practice, the disclosure rules function relatively similarly across 
jurisdictions, for instance, and the authors suggest that Europe's legal 
capital rules may be eroding somewhat.37 
In chapter 5, the authors take up related-party transactions, which 
they define to include self-dealing transactions between the company and 
one of its managers, compensation issues, the usurpation of corporate 
opportunities, and insider trading. The most common strategies for 
addressing these issues, they argue,  include trusteeship strategies such as 
approval by disinterested directors, shareholder decision rights such as 
the right to approve or veto a transaction, and ex post judicial review 
(the "standards" form of agent constraint) . Disclosure requirements 
figure less prominently in continental Europe than in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, a difference the authors attribute to the 
ownership structure of European firms. Because they tend to have large, 
well- informed shareholders, disclosure may be less important in these 
countries than would be the case if shareholders were more diffuse.38 
Chapter 6 explores the treatment of significant corporate actions such 
as mergers, assets sales, stock repurchases, and the issuance of debt. The 
authors argue that regulatory intervention is likely in each of the 
principal jurisdictions when at least one, and ordinarily all, of the 
following three conditions are met: ( 1 )  There is a large amount of money 
at stake; (2) the issue in question is similar to shareholders ' initial 
decision whether to invest, and thus is one that shareholders are 
competent to assess for themselves; and (3) self-interest is likely to cloud 
the managers ' decisionmaking perspective .39 Although the regulatory 
36. Id. at 84. For a scathing criticism of the legal capital rules used by many European 
countries, see Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The 
Case Against the European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1 1 6 5  (2001). Although 
chapter 4 points out that the rules can be costly, the authors are not as skeptical as Enriques 
and Macey of their value. 
37. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 98-99. 
38. Id. at 1 29. 
39. Id. at l 3l .  
i ' 
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strategies vary, shareholder decision rights play a particularly prominent 
role,40 and they are coupled in the United States and the United Kingdom 
with reliance on judicially enforced fairness standards.41  Shareholders are 
given the right to veto large mergers, even when they hold shares in the 
acquirer rather than the target, the authors argue, because all three 
prerequisites are met.42 None of the principal j urisdictions requires 
shareholder approval of a management decision to issue a large amount 
of debt, on the other hand, because the decision does not dovetail with 
shareholders ' expertise and because managers ' borrowing decisions are 
not systematically tainted by self-interest.43 
Chapter 7 offers a penetrating analysis of jurisdictions' very different 
treatment of another issue, takeover regulation. The key regulatory issue 
with takeovers, the authors argue, is "the allocation of decision rights on 
the offer, more particularly, the division of decision rights as between the 
target shareholders and target board. 
,,44 The authors distinguish between 
the U.K. model, which limits managers ' ability to interfere with a 
takeover offer, and the U.S .  model, which gives the board of directors 
broader authority to determine whether or not an offer will make its way 
to the shareholders.45 Although the other principal jurisdictions fall 
somewhere in between, most lean toward the U.K. model, which 
emphasizes shareholder decisionmaking and takes a dimmer view of 
directors ' faithfulness to shareholders ' interests.46 The authors also point 
out that affiliation rules such as mandatory disclosure are particularly 
important in the management buyout context, because inside bidders 
have less incentive than a competitive bidder to produce information 
about the company. 
In chapter 8, which addresses "issuers and investor protection," the 
authors focus on mandatory disclosure rules.  Thus, unlike the preceding 
chapters, which apply the ten-part schema to particular sets of corporate 
law issues, this last major chapter homes in on a single governance 
strategy : the use of mandatory disclosure as an "entry" requirement. 
40. ld. at 133-34. 
41. ld. at 135. 
42. ld. at 134. 
43. ld. at 152-53. 
44. Id. at 163. 
45. Id. at 164. Managerial agency costs are constrained under this model by fiduciary duty 
and reward strategies. !d. at 168. 
46. See id. at 170 (noting the prevalence of the U.K. model); id. at 189 (discussing [he 
effects of the two models). 
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After rehearsing the arguments for why mandatory disclosure is 
necessary-that is, why companies are unlikely to provide enough 
information to investors unless they are required to do so 47_the authors 
note that the level of disclosure that is required often varies with the 
sophistication of the likely investor. Although roughly the same 
disclosure approaches are used in all five principal jurisdictions, the 
comprehensiveness of the required disclosure varies, with the most 
extensive disclosure obligations coming in the most developed markets 
(the United States and the United Kingdom) .48 Anatomy's authors are 
agnostic on the reason for this. They suggest that perhaps developed 
markets need to protect a large number of relatively small ,  
unsophisticated investors in their midst, or perhaps interest groups such 
as lawyers and securities analysts, which benefit from intrusive 
regulation, are responsible for the higher level of enforcement.49 
Chapter 9 wraps up the book (and puts a bow on it, as it were) by 
briefly summarizing the authors ' findings and suggesting eleven avenues 
for future research. Scholars should "explore further the fundamental 
issue of how far corporate law successfully complements or supplements 
market institutions" such as credit-rating agencies, for instance;5o they 
should "investigate the trade-offs in regulatory strategies,
,
;5 1  and they 
should examine differences (such as the choice between mandatory and 
default rules) in "regulatory technique."s2 Although the framework is 
designed to "transcend[] particular jurisdictions,,
,53 the authors ' principal 
focus is on developed economies.  "An eleventh and final area of 
research," they conclude, is "to examine to what extent and with which 
47. The issue of whether mandatory disclosure rules are necessary was the subject of 
extensive debate in the 1 980s and early 1 990s. The classic works were those of John C. 
Coffee, Jr. , and Easterbrook and Fischel. See John C. Coffee, Jr. ,  Market Failure and the 
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 7 1 7  ( 1 9 84) (contending 
that analysts have inadequate incentives to ferret out all relevant information and that 
companies would engage in underdisclosure absent mandatory disclosure obligations); Frank 
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 
70 VA. L. REv. 669 (I 984) (arguing that companies would have an incentive to disclose even 
in the absence of mandatory rules). 
48.  KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 2 1 2- 1 3 .  
49. Id. at 2 13 - 14. 
50. Id. at 222 (emphasis omitted). 
5 1 .  Jd. at 223 (emphasis omitted). 
52 .  Id. at 224. These are the first, second, and fourth avenues for future research, 
respectively. 
53 .  Jd. at 225. 
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amendments our analytical framework can b e  used to deal with emerging 
jurisdictions issues. 
,,
54 
D .  A Few Concluding Words 
In a book written by seven different authors, who teamed up in 
shifting combinations to write the individual chapters,55 there is an 
obvious risk that the tone and emphasis will careen wildly from one 
perspective to another. Yet to a remarkable extent, The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law reads as if it were written by a single author.56 It has the 
same clear, streamlined tone throughout. The authors make a compelling 
case that delegation and its resulting agency problems are the central 
governance issues in large-scale corporate enterprise. Their typology also 
neatly captures the range of strategies that can be found in the corporate 
laws of every jurisdiction, no matter how widely divergent the 
approaches may look at first glance . It takes no great act o f  imagination 
to predict that the book's ten-part anatomy will soon become the lingua 
franca of corporate law discourse. Corporate law scholars and reformers 
may disagree on everything else, from the treatment of employees to the 
best approach to regulating corporate takeovers . But this is the language 
that all of them will be using, 
I I .  THE ROAD NOT TAKEN : HISTORY, POLITICS, AND CONVERGENCE 
As should be clear from the overview we have just completed, one of 
the great virtues of The Anatomy of Corporate Law is the authors ' 
emphasis on the function, rather than the form, of the corporate 
governance approaches used in different jurisdictions. 57 Comparative 
54. Id. at 226, This eleventh avenue of further research was added in response to an earlier 
version of this Review. Part V can thus now be seen as a more detailed consideration of the 
relationship between the authors' schema and the governance problems of developing and 
transition nations. 
55 .  The principal authors of each chapter are listed at the outset of the chapter. One effect 
of this format is to invite readers to search for the distinctive perspectives of the individual 
authors, a sport in which I engage on several occasions in the discussion that follows. 
56. This no doubt stems at least in part from the role Reinier Kraakmarr played as lead 
author, as reflected in his authorship of the preface and coauthorship of the first three chapters. 
57.  Here and throughout the Review, I use the term "corporate governance" broadly, to 
refer to the ten strategies as a group. Corporate governance thus includes both the governance 
and the regulatory strategies outlined in the authors' schema. 'It also includes nonlegal 
i.nfluences on corporate decisionmaking, such as norms. 
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analysis of corporate law can quickly bog down in the intricacies of the 
regulations of any given country. The difficulties become still more acute 
if the comparatist tries to account for all of the related areas (such as 
employment or commercial law) that can have an important effect on 
corporate governance. By emphasizing the similarities among 
jurisdictions, The Anatomy of Corporate Law cuts through the Gordian 
knot of difference and provides a basis for comparing and critiquing the 
corporate governance approach of any country or countries. 
But just what does the authors ' functionalism include? The authors 
sidestep this question. Rather than defining what they mean by 
"functional," they 
simply note that the exigencies of commercial actIVIty and 
organization present practical problems that have a rough 
similarity in developed market economies throughout the world, 
that corporate law everywhere must necessarily address these 
problems, and that the forces of logic, competition, interest 
group pressure, imitation, and compatibility tend to lead different 
jurisdictions to choose roughly simi lar solutions to these 
problems.58 
As it plays out in the book, the authors ' functionalism is limited in 
two important respects. First, The Anatomy of Corporate Law does not 
offer any general theory as to how the various elements of its typology fit 
together. The authors make a number of scattered generalizations about 
lawmakers ' use of the ten strategies-they point out in chapter 2 that 
most jurisdictions rely more on standards than on rules to police 
intracorporate transactions, for instance, 59 and in chapter 5 they observe 
that disclosure figures less prominently in continental Europe than in the 
United States and Japan6°-but they do not provide any general rules of 
thumb as to when we should expect one strategy to predominate rather 
than another. Because they never fully integrate the ten strategies into an 
overarching theory, many of the book ' s  insights seem to emerge less 
from the typology itself than from the authors ' efforts to make sense of 
the welter of different rules and practices of the principal jurisdictions.6 1  
58 .  KRAAKMAN E T  AL., supra note 4 ,  at 4 .  
5 9 .  ld. a t  24. 
60. ld. at 1 1 9-20. 
6 1 .  For a fascinating recent governance survey that does develop the beginnings of a 
theory as to the relationship between different governance approaches, see Katharina Pistor 
2004] Corporate Anat0D?-Y Lessons 1 54 1  
Second, the work ' s  "functionalism" is further limited by its authors ' 
decision to emphasize the common underlying structure of all corporate 
law, and to exclude all of the other messy factors (such as history, 
interest-group pressures, or economic shocks) that have contributed to 
the corporate governance we find in any given jurisdiction. I should 
hasten to add that this limitation is in many respects more a virtue than a 
vice of the analysis. It is this emphasis on underlying similarities that 
gives the book much of its power. But it is often difficult to understand 
just how corporate governance functions without taking factors ' such as 
history and interest groups fully into account, and the book's  pared-down 
functionalism makes it difficult for the authors to assess and explain the 
areas in which their five jurisdictions seem to diverge. As we shall see, 
because the authors have excluded history, politics, and other factors 
from their conception of what "functionalism" entails, their explanations 
for jurisdictional divergences often have an arbitrary, ungrounded 
quality. 
In the discussion that follows, I begin by contrasting the authors' 
approach with the most familiar conception of functionalism in the legal 
literature-the more full-blooded functional approach pioneered by the 
American legal realists during their revolt against legal formalism in the 
early twentieth century . I then explore several recent theories of 
corporate law that come closer to the realists' brand of functionalism, 
and offer more complete (though contested) explanations for the 
differences among corporate law approaches in different jurisdictions. 
Although the constrained functionalism of The Anatomy of Corporate 
Law precludes the authors from providing an alternative to, or critique 
of, these recent theories, The A natomy of Corporate Law is not irrelevant 
to the current debate. I argue in the final Section of this Part that the 
authors' ten-strategy schema is best seen as a prequel, rather than a 
sequel, to the current debates. The book provides a framework for 
understanding the choices available to the relevant decisionmakers in any 
given corporate law regime. 
et aI . ,  The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L 
ECON. L. 791  '(2002). Pistor and her colleagues argue that in common law countries, 
lawmakers tend to supplement flexible corporate laws (which often lead to strong manager 
control and weak shareholder rights) with "a strengthening of exit rights, judicial recourse, and 
a new regulatory regime for securities markets." Id. at 838. 
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A. A Less-than-Functional Functionalism ? 
When legal scholars announce that "we are all legal realists now," 
they usually mean that everyone now assumes that judicial opinions are 
more than simply the scientific application of existing law to each new 
set of facts. Rather than turning on purely deductive analysis, judicial 
decisionmaking is influenced by a wide variety of social, po litical, and 
psychological factors. 
In place of the Langdellian vision of law as purely deductive and 
scientific, the realists argued for a functional approach to legal analysis 
and legislative reform. The traditional approach, the realists argued, led' 
to attempts to put everything into rigid frameworks that were as useless 
and artificial as they were elaborate .62 A more functional approach, the 
legal realists believed, must look beyond the simple confines of the law, 
and take historical, sociological, and economic factors into account as 
wel1. 63 The law is simply a piece of a much larger system, and only by 
looking at the entire system can lawmakers and scho lars evaluate any 
given issue or develop an informed proposal for change .  
The Anatomy of Corporate Law shares something o f  this spirit i n  its 
emphasis on the practical effects of different rules and on the structural 
similarities of apparently disparate regimes. But there are clues from the 
very outset that the authors have a much more limited brand of 
functionalism in mind than did the legal realists who preceded them. The 
book ' s  title signals that the authors will  confine their attention largely to 
the "law" alone, rather than consider historical or political influences or 
other factors . Notice, too, the hint of tension between the authors' claim 
that their analysis is functional, on the one hand, and, on the other, their 
reliance on a classificatory strategy that looks suspiciously like the 
taxonomies that legal realist scholars loved to make fun of. 
62. For a useful analysis of the traditional Langdellian approach, see Thomas C. Grey, 
Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PIIT. L. REv. I ,  I I  ( 1 983). 
63 . William Douglas used the derisive term "library law" to describe the Langdellian 
approach. B ecause it failed to account for "other psychological, political, economic, business, 
social factors," Douglas argued, the Langdellian approach "grossly oversimplifies and distorts 
the nature of law." William O. Douglas, Education for the Law, Address Before the American 
Association of Collegiate Schools of Business (Apr. 1936), in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: 
THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS AS MEMBER AND 
CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURlTfES AND EXCHANGE COMM1SSI0N 278 ,  278, 280 (James Allen ed., 
1 940) . 
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This does not mean that the book's  functionalism is simply a sham. 
The authors are careful to look beyond the "law on the books," and to 
talk about how corporate governance actually plays out in practice. But 
their analysis is almost completely ahistorical and pays very little 
attention to the political factors that have influenced corporate 
governance law and norms in the five jurisdictions with which they are 
most concerned. A more full-blooded functionalism might enable the 
authors to say more about the relationship between a jurisdiction' s  
substantive rules and the extent to  which those m·les are actually 
enforced.64 The significance of this omission is particularly apparent at 
the ends of chapters 4 through 8, each of which concludes with a short 
section that is designed to explain the differences among jurisdictions 
with respect to the issues covered in the chapter. The explanatory 
sections have an ad hoc quality. Divergences in creditor protection are 
characterized as more apparent than real in chapter 4-a phenomenon the 
authors atterppt to explain by economic factors such as the cost imposed 
by creditor protections.65 Elsewhere in the book, interest-group influence 
is used to explain interjurisdictional differences.66 But there is no context 
for assessing the validity of either of these explanations. Why, if each 
explanation is correct, does economics reign supreme in one area while 
politics calls the tune in another? Is there a way to know which interest 
groups are likely to have influence in any given country, and whether 
this influence is likely to persist? 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law does not provide a basis for 
answering these questions. One way to summarize the virtues and 
limitations of the book is to distinguish between the "how" and the 
"why" of corporate governance. The Anatomy of Corporate Law is 
concerned with the "how" questions : How does corporate governance 
function? How are various jurisdictions similar and different? The 
question that the book does not attempt to answer is why. 
64. The authors themselves note this limitation at the outset of the book. KRAAKMAN ET 
AL., supra note 4, at vi ("While we address issues of taw enforcement, administration, and 
compliance throughout, we do not do so with the same consistency or emphasis that we bring 
to our comparative discussion of substantive law."). 
65 .  Id. at 98-99. 
66 . See, e.g., id. at 214 (speculating that interest-group and economic explanations for 
disclosure regulation both have elements of plausibility). 
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The ahistorical and apolitical quality of The Anatomy of Corporate 
Law is especially striking given that these issues-the "why" 
questions-are precisely where the action i& in current corporate law and 
corporate finance scholarship . In the past decade, developments such as 
the shift toward a more shareholder-oriented approach to corporate 
governance in Germany and other European countries and Japan' s 
continuing economic travails have focused attention on governance 
differences among various jurisdictions, prompting a rich debate as to the 
reasons for those differences and whether they are likely to persist. Much 
of the debate has centered on the contrast between stock -ownership 
patterns in the United States and the United Kingdom, where large 
corporations are generally widely held, and patterns in Japan and 
Western Europe, where concentrated ownership is the norm. 
Loosely speaking, one can identify three views, at times overlapping, 
that have emerged to explain the ownership and governance differences 
between jurisdictions. A brief summary and assessment of each will help 
to show where The Anatomy of Corporate Law fits, setting the stage for 
the adjustments I propose in the next three Parts. 
The single most widely debated theory comes from a group of 
corporate finance scholars : Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. Based on an extensive empirical 
survey of corporate governance around the world, La Porta and his 
colleagues have published a stream of articles emphasizing differences in 
the underlying legal regimes.67 Their approach has come to be known, 
appropriately enough, as the "law matters" thesis.  In the late 1 990s, they 
argued that ownership will remain concentrated unless the country in 
question provides legal protections for minority shareholders, such as a 
fiduciary duty requirement or voting rules that magnify the voice of 
small shareholders. The existence of these protections in the United 
States and the United Kingdom-and their absence elsewhere-' explain 
why shareholdings are dispersed in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, but concentrated outside of those jurisdictions. La Porta and 
his colleagues have also emphasized the difference between common law 
67. E.g., Rafael La Porta et ai., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 1. FIN. 47 1 
( 1 999); Rafael La Porta et ai., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1 1 1 3 ( 1 998); Rafael La 
Porta et ai. ,  Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 1. FIN. 1 1 3 1  ( 1 997). 
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and civil law legal systems. The process of case-by-case development in 
a common law system, they argue, is  ideally suited to keeping pace with 
changes in commercial life, s ince judges have the flexibility to adapt 
existing precedent to new developments. Civil law systems, by contrast, 
are rigid, relying on strict rules with little judicial discretion. On this  
view, the emergence of dispersed ownership and market-based 
governance in the United States and the United Kingdom may reflect the 
superior adaptability of these nations ' judicial systems. 
Yet the studies done by La Porta and his colleagues are flawed in 
several respects. Because their initial corporate governance studies rely 
more on the "law on the books" than on how firms are governed in 
practice, their assessments can be misleading.68 In addition, even if they 
correctly describe a country's  governance characteristics, their scoring 
system sometimes produces dubious assessments. Their most prominent 
study awards a one or a zero for each of six different governance 
characteristics, then simply tallies up the total . But the characteristics 
vary significantly in their overall importance. Two countries both scoring 
four, for instance,  may in reality provide very different levels of 
shareholder protection.69 
Perhaps more importantly, it appears that the "law matters" thesis 
may have gotten the direction of causation backwards. Although La 
Porta and his colleagues suggest that legal protection of minority 
shareholders makes liquid markets and diffuse ownership possible, in 
both the United States and the United Kingdom commercial norms and 
private arrangements seem to have paved the way both for diffuse 
68. An exchange between Italian corporate law scholar Luca Enriques and one of La 
Porta's  coauthors illustrates both this problem and the authors' awar.euess of the limitations of 
their study. During that conversation, which took place in 1 996, Enriques pointed out a 
number of mistakes in the index created by La Porta and his coauthors. He assumed the 
authors would correct the index, but when the article appeared in print, noue of the corrections 
had been made. When Enriques later brought this to the attention of one of the authors, he 
"replied . . .  that so many lawyers had provided them with contrasting comments on what the 
law really was in this or that country, that they had soon decided to disregard them." Luca 
Enriques, The Comparative Anatomy of Related Party Transactions: Preliminary Notes for the 
Discussion 1 7  n.68 (June 30, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
69. For a similar criticism, see Pistor et aI., supra note 6 1 ,  at 805. As an example of a 
misleading variable, Pistor and her coauthors point out that preemptive rights, which are coded 
as a minority shareholder protection, can sometimes benefit large shareholders rather than 
dispersed minorities. ld. at 805 n.39. 
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ownership and for the laws that La Porta and his coauthors point to as 
evidence of shareholder protection.7o 
Like their governance scorecard, La Porta and company' s  recent 
work contrasting civil and common law regimes relies on sharp 
dichotomies that can obfuscate as well as clarify. Even in civil law 
jurisdictions, for instance, judges often exercise an enormous amount of 
discretion.7 1  Despite these flaws-and perhaps in part because of 
them 72-the work by La Porta and his colleagues has transformed 
corporate law and corporate finance scholarship. It is the acknowledged 
inspiration for the rapidly expanding recent literature on the determinants 
of different corporate governance regimes. 
A second perspective, often associated with Mark Roe, focuses 
directly on the relationship between politics and a nation' s  corporate 
governance.73 In work published several years before the first of the 
studies by La Porta and his coauthors, Roe attributed the scattered 
ownership of America 's  largest corporations to populist distrust of 
concentrated financial power. Each time large financial institutions were 
poised to take substantial ownership stakes in corporate America, he 
argued, politicians intervened, kicking financial institutions out of the 
boardroom and ensuring that ownership would remain fragmented. By 
contrast, in both Germany and Japan-which lack this populist hostility 
to concentrated power-banks and other financial institutions own 
70. See, e.g. , John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and 
the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, I I I  YALE L.1.  I, 7-11 (2001). 
7 l .  See, e.g., Pistor et aI. , supra note 61, at 799 n .27 ("[1]n civil law countries courts have 
at times played a much more proactive role in shaping the contents of legal rules than the 
general principle that 'judges interpret, but do not make the law' may suggest. "). 
72. The studies by La Porta and his coauthors have spawned a growing number of articles 
calling their treatment of various countries into question. See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins, Does 
Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 1. LEGAL 
STIJD. 459 (2001) (arguing that U.K. history casts doubt on the claim that legal protections are 
a prerequisite of dispersed share ownership); Pistor et aI., supra note 61 (providihg a historical 
comparison of countries that had originated corporate governance regimes with others that had 
imported such regimes); Julian Franks et aI., Ownership: Evolution and Regulation (Aug. 25, 
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (providing a historical study of the 
emergence of diffuse ownership and minority shareholder protections in England). 
73. Roe's analysis of the political determinants of American corporate governance is set 
out in ROE, supra note 3. The description of Roe'.s work. that follows is drawn in part from the 
more extensive account in John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate 
Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 
55 VAND. L. REv. 1699, 1712-13 (2002). 
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significant blocks of stock and play a central role in corporate 
. 74 enterprIse . 
In more recent work, Roe has distinguished between "left-wing" 
social democracies, which tend to favor employees ' interests over those 
of investors, and "right-wing" countries that are not so strongly worker­
oriented.75 Roe argues that, in a social democracy, managers have an 
incentive to pay more attention to employees ' interests than to those of 
shareholders. Managers may favor opaque accounting that understates 
the company's  profits, so that the profits can be used to protect the 
managers ' and employees ' interests. The employee orientation magnifies 
the underlying conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, 
thus increasing the disadvantages of investing in a widely held company . 
As a result, the Berle-Means corporation is  less likely to emerge in a 
social democracy than it is in a country that does not have a strong 
socialist tradition. 
Roe ' s  political account-like the "law matters" approach and, to a 
lesser extent, the Rajan and Zing ales theory discussed below-suffers 
from the inevitable limitations of an effort to fit a wide variety of 
approaches into a single coherent scheme. "The squirming facts," as the 
poet Wallace Stevens once put it, "exceed the squamous mind.
, ,76 Roe' s  
political thesis arguably explains corporate governance in  Germany, but 
it does not fit England, where the shift toward diffuse ownership came 
during a period best characterized as social democratic rule .77 
A third explanation for interjurisdictional divergence comes from 
recent work by Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales.78 Focusing on the 
74. My colleague Friedrich Kubler advances a somewhat different account of bank 
influence in Germany. The hyperinflation of the early twentieth century, he argues, decimated 
the equity markets, leaving retained earnings and bank loans as the principal sources of 
financing for corporations. See, e.g., Friedrich Kubler, The Impact of Equity Markets on 
Business Organization: Some Comparative Observations Regarding Differences in the 
Evolution of Corporate Structures, 2 EUR Bus. ORG. L REv. 669 (200 1 ). 
7 5 .  Roe's political explanation of differing ownership regimes worldwide is developed in 
MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMfNANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL 
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003); and Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to 
Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L REv. 539 (2000). 
76. WALLACE STEVENS, Connoisseur of Chaos, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE 
STEVENS 2 1 5 ,  2 1 5  (photo. reprint 1 967) ( 1 954). 
7 7 .  See, e.g., Armour, Cheffins & Skeel, supra note 73, at 1 7 1 6- 1 8. 
78 .  Raghuram G. Raj an & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial 
Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FfN. ECON. 5 (2003). Raj an and Zingales have 
now developed their "great reversal" thesis into a book aimed at a more popular audience. See 
RAGHURAM G. RAJ AN & LUIGI ZING ALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS : 
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emergence of liquid securities markets, which is closely related to the 
relative dispersion of share ownership , Rajan and Zingales emphasize the 
openness of a country ' s  markets to outside investment. In countries  
where local financial institutions are especially powerful, they have often 
sought to stymie foreign investment during a time of crisis in order to 
protect their market power over companies'  access to capital. If the 
efforts of these local interest groups succeed, the country ' s  securities 
markets may atrophy, creating a "great reversal" as previously liquid 
securities markets are stifled. If a country ' s  markets are sufficiently open, 
on the other hand, or its government is decentralized, the country may 
resist the pressure to erect barriers to trade and cross-border financial 
flows . England illustrates the latter pattern in recent decades, with the 
markets remaining open and equity becoming increasingly dispersed 
over the last hal f of the twentieth century. In France, by contrast, markets 
were relatively liquid in the early twentieth century, but have become 
increasingly dominated by local interests after the shock of the two world 
wars. In each case, Rajan and Zingales argue, it is the interaction 
between interest groups and external shocks that determines the liquidity 
or illiquidity of a nation ' s  equity markets. 
Although Rajan and Zingales ' s  great reversal theory is in many · 
respects the most versatile of the recent explanations, it is not clear how 
it fits with interest-group theories that suggest cataclysms have often 
undermined rather than enhanced the influence of existing interest 
groupS.79 It also is not clear whether one can derive policy implications 
from the theory, other than the general (though important) admonition to 
open up one 's  markets as much as one can. 
C .  The Anatomy of Corporate Law as Prequel Rather than Sequel 
The scholarship that I have just discussed has transformed the 
analysis of corporate governance.  Given this variety of new theses-that 
legal reform has shaped changes in corporate development, that politics 
is central, or that the openness of markets has p layed the pivotal role­
scholars have taken a closer look at the governance patterns of countries 
Ul'.'LEASHING THE POWER OF FINANCIAL MARKETS To CREATE WEALTH AND SPREAD 
OPPORTUNITY (2003). 
79. The theory that catastrophes can undennine previously influential interest groups (and 
facilitate growth as a result) is defended at length in MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE 
OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES ( 1 982) . 
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throughout the world. More than ever before, the new corporate 
governance literature has brought economists , historians, political 
scientists, and law professors into a single, very important conversation. 
Against this backdrop, the analysis of The Anatomy of Corporate 
Law seems to borrow a favorite term of the literary critic Harold B loom, 
"belated
,,80-as if it hailed from an era before scholars had gotten their 
hands dirty exploring the complicated twists and turns of corporate 
history or had started devising models to explain the dynamics of 
governance reform. 8 !  The absence of history, interest groups, and norms 
is particularly striking given that the book's  authors are key players in 
these debates.82 
What role can a book like The Anatomy of Corporate Law, which has 
so little to say about the recent literature, p lay in the current scholarly 
and policy discussion? The best way to answer this question is to look at 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law more as a prequel than a sequel to the 
current debates . The Anatomy of Corporate Law does not extend or 
refine the current literature so much as it provides a framework for 
understanding it. 
Anyone who has dabbled in the "law matters" literature will 
appreciate the importance of developing a common language and 
framework. The literature has tended to rely on ad hoc determinations 
as to what counts as , say, minority shareholder protections, and 
how different jurisdictions ' protections compare with one another. 
80. See, e.g., HAROLD BLOOM, WALLACE STEVENS: THE POEMS OF OUR CLIMATE 5 1  
( 1 976) (discussing the issue o f  "belatedness" in Stevens's poems). 
8 1 .  In a sense, it did: The project that gave rise to the book started some ten years ago. But 
this seems unlikely to be the explanation for the authors' exclusion of history, politics, and 
other influences. As we have seen, and as discussed further below, the authors' acontextual 
framework is precisely the contribution of the book. 
82.  See, e.g., CAP[TAL MARKETS AND COMPAl\'Y LAW (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy 
Wymeersch eds., 2003); PAUL DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES' PRfNClPLES OF MODERN 
COMPANY LAW (7th ed. 2003) (providing the preeminent account of English corporate law 
doctrine and history); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1 1  (arguing that corporate law is 
converging); Gerard Hertig & Ruben Lee, Four Predictions About the Future of ED. 
Securities Regulation, 3 1. CORP. L. STUD. 359 (2003) (maintaining that recent E.U. efforts to 
integrate European securities markets will fail, but that increased harmonization and the 
eventual establishment of a pan-European securities regulator are inevitable); Hideki Kanda, 
Politics, Formalism, and the Elusive Goal of Investor Protection: Regulation of Structured 
Investment Funds in Japan, 1 2  U. PA. J. INT 'L BUS. L 569 ( 1 9 9 1 )  (arguing, based in part on 
political factors, that Japanese regulation focuses more on ex ante protections than does that of 
the United States); Edward B. Rock, America 's Shifting Fascination with Comparative 
Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367 ( 1 996) (exploring the emergence of the 
political account of corporate governance). 
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The Anatomy of Corporate Law will not make these issues go away. But 
the authors ' ten-part typology gives us a framework for making sense of 
the s imilarities and divergences of different governance regimes. Indeed, 
if we had possessed the authors' typology at the outset of the 
comparative tum in corporate governance scholarship, these recent 
debates might have had a much less helter-skelter quality. 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law is likely to have a particularly 
profound influence on the corporate finance literature. As evidenced by 
the "law matters" debate, corporate governance scholarship has 
witnessed a remarkable confluence of different scholarly disciplines over 
the past decade. Even in the 1 990s, legal scholars often ignored parallel 
scholarship in the corporate finance literature, and economists paid 
relatively little attention to the legal literature. To a remarkable extent, 
this has now changed. The days when economists ' models were so 
abstract that legal scholars could simply dismiss them are gone, and 
economists increasingly look to the legal literature for an explanation of 
the relevant legal framework. A great virtue of The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law is that it provides a simple set of tools for understanding 
all of corporate governance, and thus offers precisely the kind of 
tractability that economists look for. Given that it is both simple and 
comprehensive, the authors ' ten-part typology will appeal at least as 
much to economists as to legal scholars, and will bring the respective 
literatures even closer together. 
In the Parts that follow, I discuss three adjustments that would make 
the book' s  analysis even more powerful and complete. Parts III and IV 
argue that bankruptcy and corporate groups should be added to the issues 
addressed in the book's substantive chapters. As we shall see, bankruptcy 
raises some of the sharpest agency conflicts in all of corporate law, and 
adding corporate groups would tie the authors ' agency cost emphasis to 
their earlier discussion of the attributes of the corporate form. Part V 
briefly considers the unique problems of corporate governance in 
developing and transition countries. 
III. THE MISSING PIECE OF THE PUZZLE: BANKRUPTCY 
(Tow ARD A NEW CHAPTER 9) 
Although the authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law consider a 
wide variety of important corporate issues, they explicitly exclude 
bankruptcy from their account, lumping it together with other "bodies of 
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law [that are] designed to serve objectives that are largely unrelated to 
the core characteristics of the corporate form, and therefore do not fall 
within the scope of corporate law as we define it here.
, ,83 In some 
respects, the authors' decision to omit bankruptcy is understandable. As 
their reference to other "bodies of law" suggests, bankruptcy laws are 
usually housed in a different statute than the nation' s  corporate laws. In 
addition, as the authors also point out, "the problems of bankruptcy 
presented by corporations are often shared by other types of legal 
entities, and the elements of bankruptcy law that address those problems 
are not, in many jurisdictions, confined to entities formed as business . , ,84 corporatIOns. 
The fact that bankruptcy law is not found in the same statutory 
provisions as corporate law, however, and that it extends beyond 
corporations, is far too slim a reed on which to base a decision to banish 
bankruptcy from the analysis. First, in some countries bankruptcy is 
included within the overall corporate governance framework; in others 
its omission is at least in part a historical accident. The United States is a 
particularly good illustration of the latter point. Large-scale corporate 
reorganization was developed in the nineteenth century by the same Wall 
Street investment banks and lawyers who underwrote a company ' s  stock 
or bonds.85 If J.P. Morgan underwrote a railroad ' s  bonds, and the railroad 
later defaulted, Morgan would step in to quarterback the reorganization 
process. It was not until well into the twentieth century that bankruptcy 
was codified separately from corporate law, and it took a major set of 
New Deal reforms (which were initially framed as amendments to the 
securities laws) to drive a wedge between the corporate and bankruptcy 
bars.  Until then, corporate reorganization was a seamless part of 
corporate governance.86 
Second, if the authors' goal is to provide a functional account of the 
underlying structure of corporate law, they obviously should not be 
deterred by lawmakers ' decision to put bankruptcy and insolvency rules 
in one statute rather than another. Ten or twenty years ago, one could 
83. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 7 . 
84. Jd. 
8 5 .  DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA 63 (200 1 ) . See generally id. at 48-70 (recounting the origins of corporate 
reorganization in America). 
86. Jd. at 1 1 3-27 (describing the enactment of the Chandler Act of 1 93 8 ,  which regulated 
corporate reorganization until the bankruptcy laws were completely overhauled in 1 978,  and 
the Act's effect on the elite Wall Street reorganization bar). 
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have argued with a straight face that bankruptcy raises a separate set of 
issues.87 But in an era when developing countries understand bankruptcy 
as essential to properly functioning securities markets, and when mergers 
and acquisitions have once again become central to U.S .  corporate 
reorganization, that time has long passed.88 
Think of this Part as a plea to the authors to add an additional chapter 
to the next edition of The Anatomy of Corporate Law. In the discussion 
that follows, I imagine what this  ninth chapter might look like. I begin by 
applying the authors ' typology to the bankruptcy context. I then explore 
how corporate law and bankruptcy fit together. 
A. Bankruptcy and the Three Agency Cost Problems 
Even under U.S . law, with its emphasis on preserving normal 
business operations, ordinary regulatory strategies are altered in 
important respects when a company files for bankruptcy. In other 
countries, the adjustments are even more profound. By focusing on the 
three agency problems that The Anatomy of Corporate Law identifies as 
the heart of corporate law, we can quickly appreciate how and why this is 
so. In this Section, I briefly consider each of the three agency cost 
problems and how they play out when a company encounters financial 
distress. 
1 .  The First Agency Problem: Desperate Managers 
As a company nears insolvency, the danger that managers will 
become unfaithful agents of the firm looms especially large. As in an 
impending takeover (which the authors discuss in chapter 7) or in 
connection with some major corporate transactions (chapter 6), the 
managers of a financially troubled company face an end-game situation. 
87. When I first started arguing in my own work that bankruptcy is a facet of corporate 
law, see, e.g., David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 
1 1  Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REv. 46 1 ( 1 992), I thought that the idea might even be 
original, but I soon discovered that an earlier generation of scholars and bankruptcy lawyers 
would have been astonished to learn that anyone viewed them as separate, see, e.g., SKEEL, 
supra note 85,  at 109 (describing William Douglas 's  work on both corporate law and corporate 
reorganization issues). 
88. For discussions of the dramatic recent changes in corporate reorganization in the 
United States, see, for example, Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of 
Bankruptcy, 5 5  STAN. L. REv. 75 1 (2002); and David A .  Skeel, Jr. ,  Creditors ' Ball.- The 
"New " New Corporate Governance in Chapter 1 1 , 1 5 2  U .  PA. L. REv. 9 1 7  (2003) .  
:�-
t '. 
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There is a very good chance that they will lose their jobs unless the 
company' s  fortunes quickly tum around. As a result, managers have an 
incentive to take drastic actions to reverse the financial distress-actions 
that may be inefficiently risky and pose a danger of destroying 
significant value. 
Dealing with these high managerial agency costs is a central theme 
of bankruptcy law in every developed nation. Of the ten governance 
strategies, the three that figure most prominently are "removal" rights 
(the ex post appointment rights strategy) ,  and the· two "agent 
incentives"-"trusteeship" and "reward." As discussed in more detail in 
Section III .B,  most countries adopt either a presumptive or a per se rule 
that managers are simply ousted in favor of a court- or creditor-appointed 
decisionmaker in the event of bankruptcy. 89 In the United States, 
managers continue to run the company even after it files for bankruptcy, 
and the locus of removal rights shifts to some extent. But creditors have 
increasingly used contractual governance levers to constrain managerial 
discretion and to control both the selection and removal of managers.90 
The other standard approach to addressing managerial agency costs 
in many bankruptcy regimes is to rely heavily on trusteeship strategies. 
This is particularly true when the company' s  managers are displaced in 
favor of either an administrator or a court-appointed trustee.9 1  This 
trustee is usually required to be disinterested, and she is often instructed 
to take all of the corporation's constituencies into account in the 
decisions she makes on behalf of the troubled firm. There are two 
important qualifications, however, to the general emphasis on 
disinterestedness. First, in some countries the choice of decisionmaker 
89. In a few countries, such as England, managers also may be subject to liability if they 
continue to operate a company that is insolvent, rather than promptly initiate insolvency 
proceedings. See, e.g., Armour, Cheffins & Skeel, supra note 73,  at 1 746-47 (discussing 
"wrongful trading" rules). 
90. These developments are discussed in detail in Skeel, supra note 88.  
9 1 .  Even in the United States, where this is not the case, disinterested experts play a very 
prominent role. For instance, the bankruptcy court is authorized to appoint an examiner to 
investigate the debtor's affairs, 1 1  U.S.c. § 1 I 04(b) (2000), and in several of the most 
prominent recent cases, the reports of examiners or related experts have played a major role in 
shaping the reorganization process. In Enron's  bankruptcy, the examiner's report served as a 
roadmap for federal prosecutors and private attorneys who sued the banks that had helped to 
facilitate its manipulation of earnings, and WorldCom has adopted nearly all of the corporate 
governance reforms that former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden called for in the report he 
filed in connection with that case. See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder, WorldCom Report Recommends 
Sweeping Changes/or lIs Board, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2003, at CI;  Ben White & Peter Bchr, 
Ciligroup, J.P. Morgan Settle over Enron Deals, WASH. POST, July 29, 2003, at A I .  
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(often a receiver) is or can be controlled by one or more of the 
corporation ' s  creditors . If this is the case, the decisionmaker is likely to 
be c losely monitored by creditors, and her decisions will reflect their 
interests, even if her compensation is not based on a "reward" strategy. 
Second, the reward strategy plays an increasingly important role in 
Chapter 1 1  cases in the United States, as managerial compensation is 
often based on how quickly the managers reorganize the firm. 
In short, because bankruptcy raises serious end-game problems, 
managers are kept on a much shorter leash than when the company is 
healthy, and in most countries they are displaced in favor of an entirely 
new decisionmaker. 
2 .  Agency Issues Involving Controlling and Minority Shareholders 
Like managerial agency costs, the inside or controlling shareholder 
problem also figures quite prominently when a company encounters 
fmancial distress .  The most obvious concern with a troubled company is 
that the controlling shareholders will protect themselves at the expense of 
minority shareholders and often other parties as well .  The most 
exaggerated illustration of this problem occurred in Russia in the 1 990s, 
when bankruptcy was used by insiders and the financial institutions with 
which they were sometimes in cahoots to transfer control to the inside 
shareholders . But the problem arises in nearly every bankruptcy regime 
in one form or another. Even in companies in the United States and the 
United Kingdom that tend not to have controlling shareholders, large 
creditors can pose analogous problems if they dominate the process to 
the detriment of small creditors and other constituencies .92 
The most common strategies for dealing with majority-minority 
problems are the two affiliation terms-"entry" and "exit"-together 
with "veto," the ex post decision right. One way to limit a majority 
shareholder's  or large creditor ' s  manipulation of the process is to provide 
extensive access to information about the company ' s  financial condition 
and prospects, and to protect the terms on which investors exit. In the 
United States, Chapter 1 1  adopts this approach by giving parties in 
interest the right to examine the debtor and its managers, and by assuring 
each investor that she will receive as much in Chapter 1 1  as she would if 
92. Indeed, creditors generally assume many of the prerogatives of shareholders in the 
insolvency context, and they often become the company 's shareholders if the firm is 
reorganized. This shift in control is discussed in detail in Subsection III .A. 3 .  
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the company were liquidated.93 I n  countries that cede control to a 
creditor or creditors, the extent of disclosure may be much less extensive. 
An obvious explanation for thi s  difference is that major creditors will 
already have extensive information about the firm's  finances, and other 
creditors will derive proportionate benefits from the sale or other 
disposition of the firm's  assets by the controlling creditor. Although this 
will often be the case, there is a strong argument that extensive 
disclosure should be provided even in this context.94 
The other major strategy for reining in large creditors or shareholders 
is through the process by which decisions are approved or vetoed. 
Chapter 1 1  once again provides the most elaborate protections. All maj or 
decisions are subject to court approval, and every affected shareholder or 
creditor is entitled to vote on a proposed reorganization plan.95 The 
bankruptcy court also has the power to disqualify votes (such as votes by 
a large creditor that seeks to thwart a proposal because it is a competitor 
of the debtor) that are not cast in good faith.96 In other systems, proposals 
to sell or reorganize the company are subject to approval by a court, an 
administrator, or both.97 
3 .  Agency Problems Between the Company and Third Parties : 
The Shift in Control 
Even in countries that do not focus extensively on the interests of 
third parties like creditors and employees while a corporation is healthy, 
third parties come to the forefront in the bankruptcy context. By far the 
93.  See, e.g., 1 1  U.S.c. § 1 129(a)(7) (ensuring a minimum recovery for creditors); FED. R. 
SANKR. P. 2004 (providing rights to examination of the debtor). For an argument that 
§ 1 1 29(a)(7) functions very much like appraisal rights in corporate law, see Skeel, supra note 
87, at 493-94. 
94. In Sweden, for instance, which calls for a mandatory auction when a firm files for 
bankruptcy, creditors often arrange sales to the company's existing managers. Although this 
frequently reflects the fact that the current managers value the business more highly than third 
parties, there is also a risk that information asymmetries distort the auction process. For a 
discussion of the Swedish framework, see, for example, B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn, 
Control Benefits and CEO Discipline in Automatic Bankruptcy A uctions, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 227 
(2003); and Per Stromberg, Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy 
Auctions: Theory and Tests, 55 1. FIN. 264 1 ,  2645-48 (2000). 
95. See I I  U.S.c. § 3 63(b) (requiring court approval of transactions that are not in the 
ordinary course of business); id. § 1 126 (defining the terms on which voting and class approval 
must occur) . 
96. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 87, at 5 1 3- 1 5 .  
97. See, e.g., Klaus Kamiah, The New German Insolvency Act: Insolvenzordnung, 70 AM. 
SANKR. L.J. 4 1 7, 43 1 -32 ( 1 996). 
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most important change is a sharp shift in focus from shareholders to 
creditors as the principal decisionmakers for the firm. From the 
perspective of the ten-part schema of The Anatomy of Corporate Law, 
this shift is reflected in the increased use of governance strategies that 
give control rights to creditors and constrain the authority of the 
company' s  shareholders and managers. 
The reason for the shift in focus is that the risk that the company 
(and, more importantly, its owners) will divert value from its creditors is 
unusually high if the firm is in financial trouble. When the firm is 
healthy, what is good for shareholders is usually good for all of the 
company' s  constituencies, since shareholders benefit from good 
decisions and are hurt by poor ones.98 But shareholders ' incentives (like 
managers ' ,  as we have seen) are much more problematic when the 
company' s  fortunes go sour. They may encourage the company to take 
big gambles, for instance, or discourage the company from pursuing 
attractive opportunities if the benefit would go to creditors rather than 
shareholders themselves.99 
In creditor-oriented systems, the increase in creditor protection is 
especially dramatic. In England, for instance, a lender that holds a 
floating charge on the company' s  assets is entitled to appoint a receiver 
(a "selection right," in terms of the ten-part schema) if the company 
defaults . \ 00 Through the receiver, the lender effectively controls the 
decision as to how to resolve the financial distress .  In Germany, creditors 
are entitled to call for a liquidation (an "initiation right") if they are 
. unhappy with the course of a company' s  reorganization procedure . t O I  
98. This i s  because shareholders are the firm's  "residual owners," and thus benefit i f  the 
company pursues opportunities that have net positive present value, while eschewing those 
with negative present value. For an example of a more nuanced view, emphasizing 
shareholders' imperfect incentives even when a company is solvent, see Thomas A. Smith, 
The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 
98 MICH. L. REv. 2 1 4 ( 1 999). 
99. The incentive to take gambles is generally referred to as an "overinvestment" problem, 
and the reluctance to pursue beneficial opportunities that benefit only creditors as an 
"underinvestment" or debt-overhang problem. The classic treatment is Stewart C Myers, 
Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 1. FIN. ECON. 147 ( 1 977). 
1 00.  This right will be eliminated when the recently enacted Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, 
goes into effect. For a discussion, see Armour, Cheffins & Skeel, supra note 73,  at 1 748. 
Lenders who hold floating charges will  continue to wield significant control, however, because 
they control the debtor's access to cash and because the receivers in administration cases are 
insolvency professionals, many of whom have close ties to the banks that hold floating 
charges. 
1 0 1 .  See, e.g., Kamiah, supra note 97, at 426. 
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In Chapter L 1 ,  which is one of the least creditor-oriented bankruptcy 
frameworks, shareholders theoretically retain the right to elect directors 
in bankruptcy, but directorial elections are seldom held during a 
bankruptcy case, and shareholders who ask for them are successful only 
about half of the time. 102 Creditors are entitled to ask the court to appoint 
a trustee (a "removal" right), 1 03 and directors are instructed to focus on 
creditors, rather than just shareholders (thus, creditors are added to the 
fiduciary "standard" that constrains directorial decisionmaking), once a 
company becomes insolvent. 1 04 The crowning event of a Chapter 1 1  case 
is the vote on a proposed reorganization plan, and here too the shift in 
authority is clear. Under the elaborate Chapter 1 1  voting system, each 
class of creditors and shareholders is entitled to vote (an approval or 
"veto" right over the plan), but, as I have argued at length elsewhere, the 
voting rules have the effect of giving particular leverage to the residual 
class of creditors-that is, the first class of creditors whose claims cannot 
be paid in full. I 05 
Nearly all of the creditor protections I have described thus , far are 
found in the formal regulatory structure. Creditors also may use 
contractual mechanisms to shift control away from managers and 
shareholders after the onset of financial distress. 1 06 The single most 
important development in U . S .  bankruptcy in the past decade, for 
instance, has been the use of ex post contracts to alter the allocation of 
control rights in Chapter 1 1 .  Debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing 
agreements have figured particularly prominently in this trend. These 
agreements are now used to force sales of assets and to keep the debtor' s 
1 02 .  For a criticism of the case law, suggesting that even this number of successful 
requests is too high, see Skeel, supra note 87, at 506-09. 
1 0 3 .  I I  U.s.c. § 1 1 04 (2000). Although this step is rarely taken, creditors can use the 
threat of calling for a trustee as leverage over the company's managers. 
1 04.  See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors ' Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance . and 
the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1 1 89 (2003) (analyzing fiduciary 
duties when a firm nears or enters insolvency). 
1 05 .  Skeel, supra note 87,  at 480-8 1 .  I do not mean to suggest that the. American 
corporate reorganization framework is optimal. To the contrary, the Chapter I I  
decisionmaking rules could be improved in a variety of ways. Shareholders could be precluded 
altogether from voting on directors, for instance. But the overall effect of Chapter I I  is to shift 
decisionmaking authority away from shareholders at a time when their decisionmaking 
incentives have become problematic. 
1 06. For an excellent new analysis of the role of contracting and renegotiation in the 
bankruptcy context, see David C. Smith & Per Stromberg, Maximizing the Value of D istressed 
Assets: Bankruptcy Law and the Efficient Reorganization of Firms (Oct. 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) . 
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managers on a tight leash throughout the bankruptcy proceedings. l 07 
Managerial pay is being used in much the same way : Managers are often 
promised a larger bonus if the company is reorganized quickly, which 
gives them an additional incentive not to dally in Chapter 1 1 . 1 08 
I have focused on the enhanced role that creditors play in corporate 
governance once bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings have been 
initiated. But it is important to emphasize that creditors also figure 
prominently in corporate governance well before this time. In the United 
States, for instance, DIP financing agreements are invariably negotiated 
prior to bankruptcy, and they are often preceded by bank-led efforts to 
restructure the company that, if successful, would obviate the need for 
bankruptcy. Lenders may insist that the company bring in a new 
restructuring officer, for instance, to work with the existing managers. In 
each of the authors ' other principal jurisdictions-France, Germany, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom-bank lenders figure even more 
prominently m corporate governance. Other creditors, such as 
bondholders, may also have a governance role. 
For several related reasons, The Anatomy of Corporate Law seems to 
underemphasize the importance of debt-based governance.  First, 
although they consider creditor protections such as dividend restrictions 
and minimum capital requirements, the authors largely ignore the more 
active role that creditors play in corporate governance and the rules that 
facilitate this role . l09 Second, the decision to lump creditors together with 
other third parties in the third category of agency costs further de­
emphasizes the significance of creditors. Finally, leaving bankruptcy and 
inso lvency out of the analysis omits the context where, as we have seen, 
creditor influence is at its peak. 
The next Section develops a more complete analysis of the overall 
corporate governance dynamic .  First, however, we should briefly 
consider the other important third-party issue in bankruptcy : the 
treatment of employees. Although employees are not ordinarily given 
107 . See Armour, Cheffins & Skeel, supra note 7 3 ,  at 1 728; Skeel, supra note 88, at 
923-26; David A.  Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 
25 CARDOZO L REv. (forthcoming Apr. 2004). Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen have 
also explored these developments in some detail. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Chapter J J at Twilight, 56 STAN. L REV. 673 (2003);  Baird & Rasmussen, supra 
note 88. 
1 08 .  SKEEL, supra note 85, at 6 1 .  
1 09 .  The authors thus treat creditors as the passive recipients of various creditor 
protections, rather than focusing on their active role in corporate governance. 
i . 
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appointment rights or decision rights in bankruptcy, they often are 
protected by agent constraint strategies that either discourage layoffs or 
provide compensation for displaced workers. In Sweden, as in other 
European countries, the trustee is required to "take special care in 
'promoting employment, ' if this can be done 'without appreciable loss' 
to the claimants of the firm." 1 10 In other countries, by contrast, 
employees are protected outside of bankruptcy but have less protection in 
bankruptcy . In the Netherlands, for instance, some companies use the 
bankruptcy to effect layoffs that would be much more difficult to 
implement outside of bankruptcy. 1 1 1 
B.  The Dynamic Relationship Between Corporate Governance and 
Bankruptcy 
The previous Section identified several important patterns in most 
countries '  treatment of the three core agency problems of corporate law 
in the context of bankruptcy. Managerial agency costs are generally 
controlled through a decisive "removal" strategy, and many countries 
also rely on a heightened "trusteeship" approach. Majority-minority 
problems can be reduced by disclosure requirements, and ex post 
oversight of major transactions-the "veto" strategy-also figures 
prominently. Creditors are protected through a variety of governance 
strategies, such as "removal" rights and enhanced influence over 
important decisions. 
It would, however, be a mistake to assume that these common 
patterns suggest that corporate bankruptcy functions in more or less the 
same way in every country . To fully understand how bankruptcy (and, 
more generally, corporate governance as a whole) works in different 
jurisdictions, we need to explore the significance of two central 
distinctions: ( 1 )  differences in ownership structure, and (2) differences in 
the treatment of managers when a firm files· for bankruptcy . By focusing 
on these two factors, we can develop a dynamic perspective on the 
1 1 0. Stromberg, supra note 94, at 2646 (quoting Konkurslagen [Bankruptcy Act] ch. 7, 
§ 8 ( 1 998) (Swed.), and noting that France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and· Finland have 
similar rules). 
I l l .  See, e.g., Reinout Vriesendorp, Employees and Insolvency in Phase 11: An 
Undesirable Consequence of the Dutch 'Polder Model, ' in COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTfVES ON BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORM IN THE NETHERLANDS 27, 
38-43 (Reinout Vriesendorp et aL eds.,  200 1) .  
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relationship between corporate law and bankruptcy, a perspective that 
dramatically increases the explanatory power of our analysis. I 12  
The first distinction is connected to the differences in ownership 
structure that have been the focus of the recent debates described in 
Section II .B.  In jurisdictions characterized by concentrated stock 
ownership, firms also tend to have concentrated debt; diffuse equity, on 
the other hand, seems to be correlated with diffuse debt. The most 
obvious explanation for this pattern is agency costs. If the creditors of a 
firm with a controlling block of  shareholders were widely scattered, the 
shareholders could take advantage of their superior ability to coordinate 
by expropriating value from the diffuse creditors. I 13 In this context, bank 
loans or other forms of concentrated debt are an important counterweight 
to shareholders ' concentration. B ecause bank lending is costly, however� 
firms that are widely held (and thus have less need for close creditor 
oversight) have an incentive to issue bonds and other forms of diffuse 
debt. 1 1 4  
Second, the single most important distinction among different 
bankruptcy regimes is whether the corporation's  managers are displaced 
at the outset of the bankruptcy process. As noted earlier, in most 
countries the managers are neutralized or replaced, usually by a court- . 
appointed official. 1 1 5  In the United States, by contrast, managers continue 
to run the company . (In England, the informal "London Approach" to 
restructuring large companies parallels Chapter 1 1  in intriguing 
respects. )  1 1 6 
1 1 2.  As is no doubt apparent, this analysis mo�es us beyond the basic framework of The 
Anatomy 0/ Corporate Law and will enable us to develop an overarching theory of corporate 
law. 
1 1 3 .  See Annour, Cheffins & Skeel, supra note 73, at 1 763-65 . The fact that it is more 
difficult for the shareholders to force a large number (as opposed to a small group) of 
bondholders to write down their debt, due to the high negotiating costs, is a countervailing 
consideration in the absence of an effective bankruptcy regime. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & 
David S. Scharfstein, Optima! Debt Structure and the Number a/ Creditors, 1 04 1. POL. ECON. 
1 ( 1 996). 
1 14.  Annour, Cheffins & Skeel, supra note 73, at 1 765.  
1 1 5.  Although Germany modeled its  extensive recent bankruptcy reforms on Chapter 1 1 , 
for instance, those reforms retain a presumption that managers will be removed at the outset of 
the bankruptcy case. See, e.g., KamIah, supra note 97, at 426 (explaining that managers are 
typically replaced by administrators). 
1 1 6. In a London Approach restructuring, the banks that have participated in syndicated 
lending to a large corporate debtor agree to an informal standstill,  then conduct an 
investigation of the troubled company. If they conclude that the business is viable, the banks 
negotiate a restructuring plan entirely outside of the formal insolvency rules. The early London 
Approach restructurings were spearheaded by the central bank, which prodded smaller lenders 
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Notice the pattern here : In jurisdictions with concentrated ownership, 
we tend to see concentrated debt and a manager-displacing bankruptcy 
regime. Diffuse equity, by contrast, is usually correlated with diffuse 
debt and a manager-driven bankruptcy process . Once again, agency costs 
seem to be an important part of the explanation. In a concentrated 
ownership regime, harsh, manager-displacing bankruptcy rules reinforce 
the leverage of the monitoring bank, since managers know that the 
guillotine awaits them if they resist bank intervention in the event of 
financial distress. 1 1 7 With widely held firms, by contrast, similarly harsh 
bankruptcy rules would create disequilibrium in the governance 
framework. Faced with the prospect of removal in bankruptcy, managers 
would have a strong incentive to protect themselves from the equally 
harsh discipline of the takeover market either by encouraging friendly 
investors to buy a concentrated block of shares, or by persuading 
lawmakers to shut down the takeover market. 1 1 8 
Focusing on the dynamic relationship between corporate governance 
and bankruptcy clarifies the underlying anatomy of corporate law in 
several important ways. F irst, the analysis I have sketched out-which I . 
have referred to elsewhere as an "evolutionary theory
,, 1 1 9-enables us to 
make sense of the complex interrelationship of regulation, formal 
contract, and informal norms. By incorporating the ten-part typology into 
a more general theory, we can avoid the ad hoc quality that The Anatomy 
of Corporate Law has when it attempts to make sense of the differences 
among the governance rules of different jurisdictions. 
Second, the analysis can also be used to make predictions about the 
likely effect of changes in regulation or in the relative strength of interest 
groups. Take, as an example, the Rajan and Zing ales insights into the 
interest-group influence of local financial institutions. 1 20 The 
evolutionary account suggests that powerful financial institutions should 
to effect informal reorganizations. For a detailed discussion, see John Armour & Simon 
Deakin, Norms in Private Insolvency: The "London Approach " to the Resolution of Financial 
Distress, I J. CORP. L. STUD. 2 1  (200 1) . 
1 17 .  See David A Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 5 1  VAND. L. REv. 1 325 ,  1344-45 ( 1 998). 
1 1 8 .  Armour, Cheffms & Skeel, supra note 73, at 1 726-27; Skeel, supra note 1 1 7, at 
1 34 1 .  In the United States, there are now more barriers to hostile takeovers than in the past, 
and, as we have seen, bankruptcy is characterized by greater creditor control. 
1 1 9 .  See Skeel, supra note 1 1 7 (arguing that market-based corporate governance is likely 
to be accompanied by manager-driven bankruptcy, and bank or insider governance by 
manager-displacing bankruptcy). 
1 20 .  See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
1 5 62 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 1 1 3 :  1 5 1 9  
b e  expected to translate their influence into a harsh, manager-displacing 
bankruptcy framework through lobbying or other means. If a jurisdiction 
with market-based governance were to adopt manager-displacing 
bankruptcy rules, by contrast, we would expect to see either successful 
efforts by managers to subvert the manager-displacing rules (thus 
altering the "selection" and "removal" appointment rights) or an increase 
in the concentration of firms ' stock and debt. This would equilibrate the 
system of corporate governance in a manner consistent with the 
predictions of Rajan and Zingales, but through a mechanism that lies 
beyond the explanatory power of their theory. 
Finally, although the theory is principally descriptive in nature, it 
also has important normative implications. The most important of these 
implications involve efforts to change existing governance regimes, such 
as the market reforms in Russia and Eastern Europe.  As we shall see in 
Part V, for instance, the evolutionary theory suggests that the equity 
markets were the wrong place to start with market reform in such 
countries. 
IV. OF CORPORATE GROUPS AND CORPORATE BOUNDARlES 
(TOWARD A NEW CHAPTER 1 0) 
The large corporations that The Anatomy of Corporate Law is 
particularly concerned about explaining are not monolithic. Most, from 
Daimler-Chrysler to Mitsubishi, are extensive networks of corporate (and 
often noncorporate) entities. Enron, to give a somewhat exaggerated 
recent example, included roughly two thousand different entities. 1 2 ! 
Despite the common name, these entities often consist of a collection of 
separate enterprises that are linked together-under a single parent 
corporation, through cross-shareholdings, or in other ways. 
The ancient philosophers had a vivid expression for the notion that 
groups sometimes seem to have a single identity on the one hand, but 
also to consist of a large number of autonomous people or parts on the 
other. They called it the problem of the "one and the many .'? Suppose a 
flock of b irds is (or are) flying in tandem. Is the flock a single entity, the 
philosophers asked, or should we focus instead on the individual birds? 
1 2 1 .  See, e.g., Joseph N. DiStefano, In Delaware, Enron Found Secrecy and Savings, 
PHILA. INQUlRER, Jan. 3 1 ,  2002, at Al ("Enron Corp. organized a sprawling network of 2,000 
corporate subsidiaries in 62 countries and 23 U.S. states."). 
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Or, as the philosophically inclined poet Wallace Stevens framed the 
issue: "Twenty men crossing a bridge, I Into a village, I Are twenty men 
crossing twenty bridges I Into twenty villages, I Or one man I Crossing a 
single bridge into a village.
,
, 122 ("This is an old song," Stevens went on to 
say, "That will not declare itself . . . . 
, ,
) 1 2
3 
If we look at the corporate laws of the five countries that feature 
most prominently in The Anatomy of Corporate Law, there is a striking 
divergence of perspectives on the question of whether organizationally 
linked corporations should be treated as isolated entities or as a single 
group . In Germany, lawmakers view corporate groups as a single entity, 
and subject corporate groups (referred to in German as Konzernrecht) to 
an elaborate set of rules. 1 24 The United States, by contrast-with an 
obliviousness to the nature of groups that would make the philosophers 
wince-gives much more weight to the formal corporate boundaries and 
often ignores the overall corporate group ; Japan, France, and the United 
Kingdom fall somewhere in between. 1 25 
At various points in their study, the authors of The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law note the role of corporate groups in the countries with 
which the book is concerned. Chapter 4, for instance, which focuses on 
creditor protections, provides an elegant description of the concerns 
raised by corporate groups, such as the risks that "such a structure might 
reduce transparency by blurring divisions between the assets of group 
members," and that the "group structure allows controllers to set the 
terms of intra-group transactions, and thus to assign (and reassign) value 
within the group" in ways that could "extract value from the creditors or 
minority shareholders of a group member.,, 1 26 Aside from these scattered 
references, however, the authors have very little to say about the · · fi f 1 27 slgm lcance 0 corporate groups .  
1 22. WALLACE STEVENS, Metaphors of a Magn.ifico, i n  THE COLLECTED POEMS OF 
WALLACE STEVENS, supra note 76, at 19 ,  1 9. 
1 23 .  Id 
1 24. For a discussion of the German approach, see, for example, Herbert Wiedemann, The 
German Experience with the Law of Affiliated Enterprises, in GROUPS OF COMPANIES fN 
EUROPEAN LAWS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON MULTfNATIONAL ENTERPRISES 2 1  
(Klaus J Hopt ed. ,  1 982). 
1 25 .  See, e.g., KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 76 (describing the differences among 
jurisdictions' perspectives). 
1 26. Id at 75. 
1 27 .  As noted above, the authors' most extensive treatment of corporate groups comes in 
chapter 4, where they discuss creditor protections. In addition, in chapter 5, they note that 
German law includes strict formal requirements that a subsidiary be indemnified if the 
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I argue in this Part that by giving short shrift to the role of corporate 
groups, the authors have missed an opportunity to integrate their initial 
analysis of the attributes of the corporation-and, in particular, the 
corporation's asset-partitioning function-with their ten-part typology of 
strategies for addressing agency problems . By adding a final chapter on 
the dynamics of corporate groups, the authors could have shown how the 
choice of corporate boundaries is itself strongly influenced by (and in 
tum intluences) subsequent agency issues. Such a chapter would extend 
the analysis and at the same time bring it back to the beginning-back to 
the choice of entity fonn. 
The Part begins by speculating as to why The Anatomy of Corporate 
Law has so little to say about corporate groups. I then show how the 
choice of corporate boundaries could be incorporated into, and would 
enrich, the overall analysis. My goal , of course, is to propose another 
new chapter for the book. After the authors added a new chapter 9 to deal 
with bankruptcy, the book I imagine would include one last major 
chapter: "Chapter 1 0 : Of Corporate Boundaries and Corporate Groups." 
* * * 
Although the authors do not explain in detail why they have given 
such short shrift to corporate groups, they seem to have decided that the 
issues raised by corporate groups are not different in kind from the issues 
raised by a single corporate entity. There is an initial plausibility to th is 
view (at least to an Anglo-American corporate law scholar-I suspect 
most Gennan scholars would beg to differ), and I begin by showing why 
this is so. 
The argument is this :  The key issue both for a single corporate entity 
and within a corporate group is agency costs. Take self-dealing. A 
particular problem in a parent-subsidiary framework is the risk that the 
parent corporation (or a block of shareholders that controls the parent) 
will use its control to favor the parent and its shareholders at the expense 
of the minority. 1 28 The parent might enter into contracts with ' the 
subsidiary incurs losses from a group decision that benefits the group overall at the expense of 
the subsidiary, but that these rules are widely ignored in practice. Id. at 1 24-26. They also 
point out that the French approach, which relies less on formal rules, "is favored to become the 
model for European harmonization." !d. at 1 26. 
1 28. See id. at 1 24-26 (describing this concern as motivating the German and French 
rules). 
i '; 
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subsidiary that are wildly unfair to the subsidiary, for instance. Although 
this may be an especially pressing concern for corporate groups,  it is  
c losely analogous to the concerns raised by contracts between a single 
corporate entity and one of its managers or controlling shareholders . 
Indeed, in the United States, Delaware courts apply essentially the same 
1 . 
. 
b h 
1 29 ana YSIS ill ot contexts. 
Whether courts truly treat issues involving corporate groups the same 
way as those that involve a single corporate entity is a matter of much 
discussion, even in the United States. Commentators have long assumed 
that courts are more willing to "pierce the veil" within a corporate group, 
for instance. 1 30 But this by itself would not call into question the authors' 
decision to forgo separate treatment for corporate groups. Even if the 
outcomes differ somewhat, the fact that veil piercing is analyzed 
similarly in corporate groups and in other contexts would justify a 
decision not to treat corporate groups separately with respect to this kind 
of issue. 
If we shift our focus, however, and look at how and why corporate 
groups are set up in the first place, rather than transactions entered into 
thereafter, the case for downplaying corporate groups looks much more 
problematic. Corporate groups don 't simply spring forth fully formed, 
like the goddess Athena from her father Zeus ' s  head. To the contrary, 
they are the product of numerous decisions. Firms must decide whether 
to include an entire business within a single corporation or to separate it 
into two or more distinct corporations, for instance; or whether to cement 
ties with another corporate group through cross-shareholdings. Each of 
these decisions is influenced in crucial respects both by agency costs­
the focus of the authors ' ten-part typology-and by the attributes of the 
corporate form. 
To appreciate how these factors help to explain corporate groups, 
recall that, as a historical matter, the most important benefit of the 
1 29.  See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (DeL 1 997) (applying the entire­
fairness standard in a transaction involving a controlling shareholder); Kahn v. Lynch 
Communication Sys. ,  Inc. , 638 A.2d 1 1 1 0 (DeL 1 994) (relying on a similar standard in a case 
involving a squeeze-out acquisition by a corporate parent). 
1 30. When courts "pierce the veil," they hold the shareholders, parent corporation, or 
related subsidiaries liable for the obligations of the corporation in question, thus refusing to 
honor the corporate attribute of limited liability. For an empirical study of the outcomes in 
veil-piercing cases suggesting that parent corporations are frequently held responsible for 
obligations of their subsidiaries, though not quite as commonly as is often thought, see Robert 
B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 
( 1 9 9 1 ) .  
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corporate form was asset partitioning. 1 3 I  As Hansmann and Kraakman 
have argued in several pieces showcasing this attribute, the corporate 
form facilitates creditor monitoring and thus reduces a firm's  cost of 
credit by assuring corporate creditors that they will have priority over 
creditors of any of the corporation' s shareholders. 1 32 Monitoring 
efficiencies thus provide one explanation for the decision to. house 
different parts of an enterprise in separate corporations. If (to use their 
illustration) the company includes both an oil business and a chain of 
hotels, for instance, the benefits of speciaIized monitoring by different 
creditors might be one reason to set up separate oil and hotel 
corporations, rather than treating them as divisions within a single 
business. 
Monitoring efficiency is unlikely to be a complete explanation for 
the decision to incorporate the oil and hotel businesses separately, 
however. As Hansmann and Kraakrnan note, the parties could achieve 
similar monitoring benefits in other ways, such as secured finance. If one 
creditor lent on a secured basis to the oil business, and another to the 
hotels, each could serve as a specialized lender to the part of the business 
against which it held a priority claim. 1 33 
In a recent article, George Triantis argues that the tradeoff between 
managerial flexibility and agency costs is another important factor in 
deciding how to structure a corporate group . 1 34 If the oil and hotel 
businesses are structured as divisions within a s ingle corporate entity, 
managers can more easily shift capital from one business to the other as 
circumstances change. Because managers have better information than 
anyone else about the prospects of each business ,  this flexibility-which 
finance theorists refer to as a "switching option[]"--can prove very 
valuable. 135  But greater flexibility means greater agency costs, s ince 
managers may use the discretion to further their own interests rather than 
the best interests of the enterprise. They may prop up a hopeless 
1 3 1 .  See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
1 32.  See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 20, at 3 9 3 ;  Hansmann, Kraakman & 
Squire, supra note 20, at I .  
1 3 3 .  Although Hansmann and Kraakman acknowledge the role of secured credit, they 
argue that it is at most a partial substitute for asset partitioning. See, e.g., Hansmann, 
Kraakman & Squire, supra note 20, at 4 (questioning the usefulness of secured credit where 
there is a '''floating' group of creditors"). 
1 34. George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal 
Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts i" Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 
1 1 7 HARV. L. REv. 1 1 02 (2004). 
1 3 5 .  Id. at 1 1 0 3 .  
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business, for instance, in order to protect their perks or their j obs. ! 36 
Separate incorporation reduces this problem, since separate corporations 
are subject to higher disclosure obligations, and their transactions are 
subj ect to greater scrutiny, than is the case for divisions of a single 
corporation. ! 37 Where flexibility is particularly important, we would 
expect businesses to be housed in a single corporation� by contrast, 
separate corporations make more sense if the switching option is less 
valuable or managerial agency costs particularly high. 
Seriously complicating the boundary decision-or at the least, our 
efforts to explain the corporate groups we see in practice-is the fact that 
the boundaries are often indirectly influenced by various kinds of 
noncorporate regulation. The most obvious illustration is tax. When 
Enron set up thousands of separate entities for its structured finance 
transactions, or when corporations establish separate offshore 
corporations to hold title to their intellectual property, the boundary 
decision was or is driven more by tax considerations than by corporate 
govemance. ! 3 8  A particularly important tax concern for multinational 
companies is the treatment of transfer pricing. An obvious implication 
for understanding corporate groups is that, to the extent these regulations 
encourage distortions in the corporate structure, the distortions should be 
viewed as an important cost of such regulations. 
Corporate law itself can, of course, distort these boundary decisions 
as well. If the German Konzernrecht indemnification requirements were 
strictly enforced, the obligation to compensate subsidiaries for any 
decision that redistributed value elsewhere in the group could have a 
chilling effect on the incorporation of separate subsidiaries.  In practice, 
as the authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law point out, the 
indemnification requirements seem to be largely ignored so long as the 
b 'd '  . I 1 39 SU SI tary IS so vent. 
In the United States, the recent WorldCom bankruptcy sparked a 
controversy over whether bankruptcy courts should "substantively 
1 36. Id. at 1 1 05. 
1 37 .  fd. at 1 1 25-27 (describing the higher fiduciary duty and disclosure obligations where 
separate subsidiaries are set up). 
1 3 8. Delaware does not impose a state tax on many kinds of passive income (such as 
income from intellectual property rights). This benefit seems to have been a major 
consideration in Enron's decision on where to set up separate business entities. See, e.g., 
DiStefano, supra note 1 2 1  (characterizing the tax-free status of passive income as a generally 
important attraction of Delaware as a state of incorporation) . 
1 39. KRA.AKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 25. 
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consolidate" the obligations of a corporate group whose members file for 
bankruptcy-that is ,  ignore the group ' s  corporate boundaries and lump 
the creditors of different entities together. In the past, courts have refused 
to consolidate the obligations of a corporate group unless the boundaries 
had been essentially ignored outside of bankruptcy. In WorldCom, 
however, the debtor argued for consolidation on administrative grounds, 
as a way of simplifying the restructuring process. 140 If WorldCom 
foreshadows a loosening of the restrictions on substantive consolidation, 
this shift would have the opposite effect from strict enforcement of the 
German indemnification rules: Whereas the German rules would enforce 
the boundaries between firms too strictly, substantive consolidation 
would make them too porous. In each case, the benefits of the boundaries 
would be undermined. 
The corporation and its shareholders are not the only ones that are 
affected by the company' s  boundary decisions . Corporate boundaries 
also have important implications for the agency relation between the firm 
and third parties. In many jurisdictions, the most important corporations 
are government-owned or government-controlled. A particularly vexing 
boundary issue in this  context is whether and when to permit 
corporations to expand into new businesses. Because government-owned 
corporations often have market power in their core business, there is a 
danger that the firm will use an existing monopoly to subsidize its 
expansion into the new business, to the detriment of actual and potential 
creditors. One way to minimize the risk of inappropriate cross­
subsidization would be to require the corporation to set up a separate 
subsidiary if it wished to enter into a new line of business. 1 4 1  As with the 
analogous restrictions on u.s.  financial services corporations, 142 this 
140. The decision to substantively consolidate the entities for the purposes of 
WoridCom's proposed reorganization plan was challenged by a group of creditors but later 
settled. Many observers (including this one) suspect that the bankruptcy court would have 
rejected the challenge and upheld the consolidation. 
1 4 1 .  For a more detailed defense of this proposal, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Virtual 
Privatization: Governance Reforms for Government-Owned Firms, 2 J. CORP. L. STIID. 82, 
1 02-06 (2002). 
142. Until the recent repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S .c.  §§ 24, 78, 377-378 
( 1 994) (repealed 1 999), banks were prohibited from engaging in both investment and 
commercial banking, and banks and insurance companies could not be housed in the same 
corporate group . These barriers have since been removed, but such businesses must still be set 
up as distinct subsidiaries under a single corporation.  See. e.g., Adam Nguyen & Matt 
Watkins, Recent Legislation, Financial Services Reform, 37 HARV. 1. ON LEGIS. 579 (2000) 
(describing the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the new requirements to replace its 
regulations). 
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structural separation would make it much easier for regulators or other 
observers to track the transfers of funds from one business to the other, 
and thus would reduce the risk that the corporation would use profits 
from a monopoly business to subsidize expansion into other, more 
competitive areas. 
The benefits of a mandatory subsidiary requirement for government­
owned corporations vividly illustrate a more general point about the 
relationship between regulatory oversight and a firm's decision regarding 
how to structure the corporate group . The finn (and -its investors) is 
concerned about the tradeoff between flexibility and managerial agency 
costs. The optimal choice for the firm's  shareholders is not always the 
socially optimal choice, however. This potential conflict suggests that a 
third crucial factor influencing boundary decisions is the role of 
regulatory intervention in minimizing the risk that such decisions will 
impose costs on third parties that are not internalized by the corporate 
group engaging in corporate restructuring. 
By adding corporate groups to the overall analysis of corporate law, 
as I have attempted to do here, we can develop a more complete theory­
one that integrates the attributes of the corporation with the agency cost 
concerns that animate the authors' ten-part typology .  This more complete 
theory also has the virtue of accounting for the way large corporations 
are actually structured in most jurisdictions. Corporations are not simply . 
one; they are also many. 
v . CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION 
COUNTRIES (TOWARD AN EXPANDED EPILOGUE) 
. The Anatomy of Corporate Law is framed largely as an analysis of 
corporate governance in developed economies. "[W]e focus," Kraakman 
announces on the first page of the preface, "on what we understand to be 
corporate laws of five major commercial jurisdictions: France, Germany, 
Japan, the UK and the U . S .
,
, 143 But their analysis is not limited to this 
context: "[A] signal achievement of this  book is," as Kraakman puts it, 
"the development of an analytical framework that transcends particular 
jurisdictions .
,
, 1 44 Underscoring the universality of intended application is 
the authors' choice of touchstone jurisdictions. Few countries develop 
1 43 .  KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at v. 
144. ld. 
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their own corporate law from scratch. Major enactments are usually 
borrowed from the laws of another country, and it turns out that nearly 
every corporate law in the world can be traced, directly or indirectly, to 
one or more of the five jurisdictions on which the authors focus . 1 45 
The implicit universality of the framework-it is, after all ,  the 
anatomy of corporate law-raises an obvious question: Is it safe to 
assume that the typology will  help us to understand how corporate law 
functions in every country, everywhere in the world? To answer this 
question, conduct a simple thought experiment. Suppose you are a 
corporate law professor, and you have been asked to visit a developing or 
transition country. You will be expected to talk to the relevant officials, 
market players, and community groups in order to prepare a report 
offering suggestions for reform. (This thought experiment is hardly 
far-fetched; many are the corporate law scholars who have packed their 
parkas or sunblock and headed to the airport to consult on corporate or 
market reform in the past decade or so.) If you brought only your copy of 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law-already available in paperback, one 
hopes, by the time you left-and spent the visit asking your interviewees 
which regulatory and governance strategies the country had adopted, 
would this tell you everything you needed to know? Would the 
interviews give you a complete picture of how governance functioned in 
the developing country? 
The answer, of course, is no. If we have learned anything from the 
corporate governance reform projects of recent years, it is that the 
strategies that are used in developed countries cannot simply be 
transp lanted into a developing country with the expectation that they will 
function in a comparable way. In terms of practical importance, there is 
no greater corporate governance issue in the world today than the 
question of how to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
deve loping countries. 
In the epilogue, the authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law 
characterize the book as "provid[ing] a platform for a wide-ranging 
program of multi-disciplinary research on corporate law," and suggest a 
series of "avenue[ s]" for future research that scholars could pursue. 1 46 
Although some of the proposed projects can be seen as relevant for 
1 45 .  See, e.g., Pistor et aI., supra note 6 1 ,  at 799 (describing England, the United States, 
Germany, and France as "spearhead[ing] the development of corporate law"). 
1 46. KRAAKMAN ET AL. ,  supra note 4, at 222. 
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developing economies, the authors clearly have the United States, 
Western Europe, and Japan most directly in mind. 
The discussion that follows suggests one final adjustment to the 
authors' handiwork. Call it the last and most important avenue for future 
research: How can we apply the lessons of this book and other recent 
corporate governance work to the distinctive problems of developing 
countries? 147 In the first Section, I briefly describe a few of the 
unexpected consequences of recent governance reforms and summarize 
the lessons that can be learned from them. The Section that fonows 
sketches out several proposals for how we should think about reform. 
A. The Law of Unintended Consequences: A Brief, Selective Tour 
Over the past decade or so, starting with the collapse of the Soviet 
empire in 1 9 89, corporate governance reform has been on the agenda 
across the globe. More often than not, reforms have had very different 
effects than their proponents expected. Let me start with two short 
examples, chosen almost at random. 
The most dramatic wake-up call, at least for academic reformers, 
came in Russia. Starting in the early 1 990s, a group of academic experts, 
many of them based at Harvard, were hired to consult on corporate 
governance and market reforms.  In connection with the project, two of 
the leading American corporate law scholars (including one of the 
authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law) proposed an elegant 
framework for Russian corporate law. 148 To protect minority 
shareholders against oppression, they called for a combination of per se 
rules and enhanced voting requirements. When Russia enacted a new 
corporate law, its lawmakers drew extensively on the framework that the 
academics had proposed. Despite the elegance of the proposal, however, 
it proved to be a complete disaster in practice-not because there was 
anything wrong with the new provisions, but because the formal 
framework was almost completely ignored. Corporate insiders ravaged 
1 47 .  In the initial draft of The Anatomy of Corporate Law, the authors proposed ten 
avenues for further research. As noted earlier, they added an eleventh-"emerging 
jurisdictions" issues-in response to this Review. See id. at 226. 
1 48 .  Bernard B lack & Reinier Kraakrnan, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 
1 09 HARV. L. REv. 1 9 1 1 ( 1 996). 
, i ,. 
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Russia 's  newly privatized corporations, undeterred by the corporate 
governance framework. 149 
Second example:  Hungarian reformers dramatically revised their 
bankruptcy laws in the mid-I 990s, drawing extensively on the U.S .  
bankruptcy laws. They framed the new regime as a Chapter 1 I -style 
corporate reorganization code and included a provision that authorized 
debtor-in-possession financing, just as in the United States. In practice, 
however, Hungarian firms are almost never able to obtain financing­
apparently in large part because lawmakers omitted the special priority 
U .S .  lenders are given-and the reorganization provisions are rarely used 
to reorganize troubled firms. l so One could multiply these examples 
almost endlessly. India created special bankruptcy tribunals, but the 
experiment was arguably a complete failure. l S I  Efforts to privatize 
corporations in Eastern Europe have had dramatically different 
consequences than reformers expected. I S2 
* * * 
What are some of the lessons we can learn from these expenences 
over the past decade, from the unintended consequences of reform? The 
first lesson is that even the most carefully crafted corporate governance 
framework is useless if the underlying infrastructure isn't in place. In 
many developing and transition countries , the judicial system is not 
effective enough to protect basic property rights . In this context, any 
corporate governance reform effort needs to take account of the 
limitations of the underlying enforcement system. 
149. For a postmortem speculation about what went wrong, with a particular emphasis on 
the absence of adequate judicial enforcement, see Bernard Black et aI., Russian Privatization 
and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1 73 1  (2000). For an 
empirical analysis of analogous problems with the Russian bankruptcy framework (with a 
focus on expropriation by alliances of managers and regional governments), see Ariane 
Lambert-Mogiliansky et aI., Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Russian Evidence (June 1 8 ,  
2003) (unpublished manuscript, o n  file with author). 
ISO. See, e.g., Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Remarks at the Bankruptcy-Corporate Governance 
Panel Meeting, Institute for Policy Dialogue, Columbia University (Sept. 24, 2003) (arguing 
that the failure to give priority to debtor-in-possession finance has been a "key to the failure of 
[Hungary 's reorganization] procedure in practice"). 
1 5 1 .  For one analyst ' s  opinion, see E-mail from Leora Klapper, Senior Financial 
Economist, World Bank (Feb. 1 1 , 2004) (on file with author) (describing problems with the 
specialized courts in India, and with reforms in Sri Lanka, Romania, and other countries). 
1 52. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong 
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L.  REv. 7 8 1 , 782 (200 1) .  
2004] Corporate Anatomy Lessons 1 573 
Even if judicial enforcement is adequate, governance reforms are 
unlikely to have a significant effect unless there is a demand for them. 
"We find two distinct patterns of legal change in transplant countries,, , 1 53  
Katharina Pistor and her colleagues explain in a recent study of corporate 
evolution in ten countries, some of which served as the source and others 
as the recipient of corporate law frameworks. "One is lethargy. The other 
is quite the opposite-erratic change.
,, 1 54 In the transplant jurisdictions 
they studied, the "countries that receiver d] foreign law [were] frequently 
unprepared �or the changes it [broughtJ.
,, 1 55 As a result, the new laws 
were either ignored or repeatedly altered, with little apparent effect on 
actual corporate governance. 1 56 
Even if there is an adequate infrastructure, and even if there is a 
demand for a new law, reforms often have a very different effect in the 
new country than in the jurisdiction from which they are borrowed or 
adapted. As i llustrated by the Hungarian experience noted above, a small 
change in a provision borrowed from elsewhere can lead to dramatically 
different results in the adopting country. 
B .  Learningfrom the Recent Mistakes 
By itself, The Anatomy of Corporate Law would be a most 
misleading guidebook for understanding corporate governance in a 
developing or transition country . Because the authors ' typology is based 
largely on the law on the books, it is not designed to make sense of the 
vicissitudes of corporate law in many countries-such as the divergence 
between rules and practice, and the comparative irrelevance of formal 
rules in the absence of adequate judicial enforcement. 1 57 But if we put the 
1 53 .  Pistor et a!., supra note 6 1 ,  at 840. 
1 54. Id. 
1 5 5 .  Id. at 841. 
1 56.  Id. (describing the experience in Colombia); see also Katharina Pistor et aI . ,  Law and 
Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325, 328 (2000) ("Past experience 
with legal reforms suggests that where new laws were forced upon a judicial system unfamiliar 
with the underlying legal tradition and were not adapted to fit the specific local context, the 
effectiveness of the law suffered."). 
157 .  Not surprisingly, existing data suggest that an increase in the enforcement of contract 
rights can have a dramatic effect on borrowers ' access to credit. See, e.g., Daniefa Fabbri & 
Mario Padula, Legal Institutions, Credit Market and Poverty in Italy (Apr. 1, 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding much greater access to credit in Italian 
regions where courts function more efficiently, as measured by backlogs of cases). Judicial 
enforcement is also linked to higher rates of bankruptcy filings. See Stijn Claessens et a!., 
Resolution o/Corporate Distress in East Asia, 1 0  J. EUR. FIN. 1 99, 200 (2003). 
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book in the broader context of the insights I have developed in this 
Review, it offers a "platform"-to use the authors ' word-both for 
understanding corporate governance in developing countries and for 
rethinking the focus of future reforms . Although the regulations and 
governance reforms supported by law in developed jurisdictions like the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan are not 
available by way of the judiciary in many developing and transition 
nations, The Anatomy of Corporate Law still gives us a framework for 
understanding and creating strategies aimed at minimizing the agency 
issues inherent in the corporate form-particularly if we supplement the 
framework with the more robust functional analysis discussed in Part H. 
One obvious implication of the absence of effective judicial 
enforcement i s  that policymakers should place less emphasis on devising 
elaborate corporate codes for developing and transition jurisdictions. 
Harnessing private solutions-governance strategies that minimize the 
need for court oversight-may be much more promising in this regard. 
Interestingly, contemporary practices in two of the most developed of all 
nations-the United Kingdom and the United States-could offer a 
useful analogy. In England, under the so-called "London Approach," the 
central bank has long put informal pressure on bank lenders to 
restructure troubled corporate debtors outside of the formal insolvency 
framework. 158 In an emerging country that has a stable central bank but 
spotty judicial enforcement, a process resembling the London Approach 
could prove much more effective than full-blown insolvency rules. 
Somewhat similarly, in the United States, corporate debtors that wish to 
minimize their stay in bankruptcy can negotiate the terms of a 
restructuring outside of bankruptcy and ask the court to confirm a 
"prepackaged" reorganization plan. Like the London Approach, this 
strategy-which harkens back to the nineteenth-century railroad 
receiverships-sharply reduces the need for judicial involvement. 1 59 
Of course, it i s  important to recognize that private negotiations carry 
their own potential risks. There is a danger that the parties represented at 
the bargaining table will favor themselves in the restructuring at the 
expense of other interested parties. This suggests both that the 
effectiveness of private negotiations will depend in important part on the 
1 58 .  For a description of the London Approach, see supra note 1 1 6. 
1 59. For a similar point, see Erik BerglOf et al., The Formation of Legal Institutions for 
Bankruptcy: A Comparative Study of the Legislative History 37 (Feb. 19 , 200 1)  (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
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reputational stake that the principal players have in the quality of the 
restructuring, and that at least limited judicial oversight is necessary to 
protect third parties. 
A second, and quite related, implication is in the context of market 
reform. During the wave of privatizations in Eastern Europe and Russia 
in the 1 990s, reformers assumed that the way to develop liquid capital 
markets was to focus on stock. 1 60 Yet much of the analysis of this 
Review suggests that debt financing-either bonds or bank lending­
may be a more sensible starting point than the stock market. In most 
countries, as in nineteenth-century America, there is likely to be an 
existing interest group that already has a stake in the credit markets and 
could serve as an underwriter for corporate bonds. 1 6 1  Reformers could 
look to the underwriters, or to existing professionals in the accounting 
industry or the bar, to act as bond trustees to represent the interests of 
scattered investors. These professionals would have a reputational stake 
in creating a properly functioning market, since their future business 
would depend on investors ' willingness to continue buying bonds. In 
addition, investors might be less skittish about investing in bonds than in 
stocks, both because debt has a higher priority claim against the 
company' s  assets and because bond ownership is a less dramatic step for 
individuals who have not previously participated in the market. 1 62 
In some emerging markets, bank lending may be a superior source of 
corporate financing to that of publicly traded bonds or stocks. In part, the 
choice may turn on the nature of a country's principal industries. "For 
the less risky, capital intensive modernization investments characteristic 
of lower levels of economic development," as the authors of one recent 
study note, "bank finance may be more appropriate [than equity 
160. For an extensive and important analysis of the preconditions for developing effective 
securities markets, see generally B lack, supra note 1 52. 
1 6 1 .  The most obvious candidate, as in nineteenth-century America, is existing or newly 
emerging banks. See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 85,  at 63-69 (describing the role of Wall Street 
investment banks and the Wall Street bar in the bond market and corporate reorganizations). 
162 .  For a similar point about the relationship between equity and debt finance, see 
CHARLES W. CALOMIRlS, U.S.  BANK DEREGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 248 
(2000). Specifically, Calomiris notes that equity sometimes may "not be a feasible alternative 
to debt, either because the costs of resolving asymmetric information between firms and 
ultimate sources of funds are large . . .  or b ecause the equrty holder is unal:>le to exert control 
over corporate management." Id. Notice that the argument in the text is not inconsistent with 
the fact that liquid stock markets seem to be developing before bond markets in several 
European countries whose corporate governance has traditionally been characterized by 
concentrated ownership: In these countries, such as Germany and France, there tS a much 
longer tradition of market investment. 
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markets] .
,
, 1 63 In contrast to securities markets, moreover, which may be 
entirely lacking, most developing and transition countries have at least an 
embryonic banking system to serve as a starting pOi!lt. 1 64 
The experience with privatization in Eastern Europe underscores the 
case for focusing on bond markets or bank lending rather than stock. As 
recounted by Erik BerglOf and Patrick Bolton, the "number of firms 
l isted on [the Czech, Slovak, Lithuanian, and Romanian] stock 
exchanges increased dramatically" shortly after reforms were 
implemented, "but after an initial phase of high trade volumes, most 
stocks became and remained i lliquid.
, , 1 65 Within a few years, stock 
ownership in most companies was once again highly concentrated, stock 
changed hands relatively infrequently, and corporate finance in the most 
successful jurisdictions was dominated by bank lending. 1 66 
Rather than trying to create a liquid stock market from scratch, debt 
finance, together with manager-displacing bankruptcy, is a more 
plausible starting point for reform in these countries. This suggests that 
the most important agency cost issues may stern from the relationship 
between lenders and the firm, and that creditor protection should take 
precedence over efforts to enhance the rights of minority shareholders as 
the focus of future reforms . 1 67 In the bankruptcy context, efforts to 
reduce the information asymmetries between principal bank lenders and 
other creditors should take center stage, given the risk that well­
positioned bank lenders may divert value from small creditors. 
There is another point as well, a lesson that takes us back to the heart 
of The Anatomy of Corporate Law. The book provides a framework for 
understanding the issues that are inherent to the corporation, and thus 
common to every jurisdiction; this Review has attempted to develop the 
authors ' analysis into a more fully functional perspective on corporate 
law.  But this framework cannot substitute for the hard work of 
163 .  Pistor et aI ., supra note 1 56, at 327. 
1 64 .  Id. As discussed in Section IILB, firms that borrow from banks, and thus have 
concentrated debt in their capital structure, are likely to have concentrated stock ownership as  
welL Although stock markets will often be illiquid under these circumstances, there have been 
at least a few exceptions to this tendency. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
German corporate finance seems to have been characterized by both bank finance and an 
active stock market. See, e.g., CALOMIRlS, supra note 1 62,  at 24 1 -50 (describing the role of 
banks and equity, and the relative dearth of bond finance, in pre-World War I Germany). 
1 65 .  Erik BerglOf & Patrick Bolton, The Great Divide and Beyond. Financial 
Architecture in Transition, J. Eco . PERSP. ,  Winter 2002, at 77, 86. 
1 66. Id. -at 87. 
1 67. See, e.g., Pistor et aI., supra note 1 56, at 327.  
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understanding the peculiar institutional dynamics of any given 
developing or transition jurisdiction. The framework can help reformers 
determine what questions to ask, but the most effective reforms are likely 
to be those that are sensitive to jurisdiction-specific nuances such as the 
institutions that are already in place. 
CONCLUSION 
As I noted at the outset, The Anatomy of Corporate Law is the most 
important corporate law book of the decade. This Review has offered 
several friendly amendments to the authors ' analysis. I have argued that 
they should add chapters on bankruptcy and corporate groups, and 
expand the epilogue to consider the extent to which their framework does 
and does not apply to corporate governance in developing nations. But 
these adjustments do not detract in any way from the importance of the 
authors' underlying schema. The ten-part typology of The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law will provide the next generation of corporate law 
scholars and policymakers with a framework for understanding the 
characteristic dilemmas of corporate enterprise. For comparative 
corporate law scholarship, the future starts here. 
